4. The bulk of L&H Koreas sales came from contracts signed at the end of quarters, so
managers could meet ambitious quarterly sales targets and receive large bonuses. For
instance, 90% of the revenue recorded by L&H Korea in the second quarter of 2000 was
booked in 30 deals signed in the final 9 days of the quarter.
(Unethical but legal if the sales contracts are real. This example also highlights how the
Do you believe KPMGs claim that its auditors have been fooled by L&H? If yes, how
could the auditors have been fooled so easily? If you dont believe they were fooled, why
did they go along with the aggressive financial reporting?
KPMG accused the former top management of L&H of signing off on revenue inflation tactics,
of lying about key business structures within the company, of influencing others to give false
information to KPMG auditors, and of orchestrating a campaign to minimize their involvement
in the events that have led to the calamitous downfall of the company.
However, sudden changes in revenue figures should have raised a red flag (at least, so it seems
in hindsight). For example, L&H saw huge revenue growth in Singapore in 1998. In 1999,
On the other hand, the auditors may have been fooled because they did not understand the
relatively new and complex speech products business. They also may have exhibited
confirmation bias by signing off on a prominent, growing client that they clearly wanted to
retain. Or was auditor independence compromised in some other way (e.g., because of other
management services with their client)?
But, if auditors are so easily fooled, then what role do they play, or which assurances do they
offer, for the functioning of the capital markets?