An airplane like the 787 has a design about as complex as that of a nuclear reactor power
plant, and Boeing’s equally complex offshore organizational structure didn’t help the
execution. Boeing outsources 67 percent of its manufacturing and many of its
engineering functions. While the official assembly site is in Everett, Washington, parts
were manufactured at 100 supplier sites in countries across the globe, and some of those
suppliers subcontracted piecework to other firms. Because the outsourcing plan allowed
vendors to develop their own blueprints, language barriers became a problem back in
Washington as workers struggled to understand multilingual assembly instructions. When
components didn’t fit together properly, the fixes needed along the supply chain and with
engineering were almost impossible to implement. The first aircraft left the runway on a
test flight in 2009, but Boeing had to buy one of the suppliers a year later (cost: $1
billion) to help make the planes. The first customer delivery was still years away.
If Boeing and industry watchers thought its troubles were over when the first order was
delivered to All Nippon Airways (ANA) in 2011, three years behind schedule and after at
least seven manufacturing delays, they were wrong. Besides the continuing woes of
remaining behind schedule (848 planes have been ordered but only 6 percent have been
delivered), Boeing’s Dreamliner has suffered numerous mechanical problems. After the
plane’s technologically advanced lithium-ion batteries started a fire on one aircraft and
forced another into an emergency landing in January 2013, ANA and Japan Airlines
grounded their fleets. The FAA followed suit, grounding all 787s in the United States.
The remaining 50 flying Dreamliners worldwide were then confined to the tarmac until a
solution could be found.
This looked like an organizational structure problem, both at corporate headquarters and
abroad. However, there have been so many management changes during the 787’s history
that it would be difficult for anyone to identify responsibility for errors in order to make
changes in the team or the organizational structure. For the work done abroad,
restructuring reporting relationships in favor of smaller spans of control to heighten
management accountability and tie suppliers to the organizational structure of corporate
Boeing could be considered. Or “reshoring” to bring manufacturing physically close to
the final assembly site and under Boeing’s control while centralizing the organization
structure could be an option.
Sources: S. Denning, “The Boeing Debacle: Seven Lessons Every CEO Must Learn,” Forbes (January 17, 2013).
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/17/the-boeing-debacle-seven-lessons-every-ceo-must-learn/; E. Frauenheim,
“Homeward Bound,” Workforce Management (February, 2013), pp. 26-–31; C. Hymowitz, “Boeing CEO’s Task: Get the Dreamliner
Airborne Again,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek (January 24, 2013),.
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-24/boeing-ceos-task-get-the-dreamliner-airborne-again/; D. Nosowitz, “Why Is
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner Such a Piece of Crap?” Popsci (January 17, 2013),.
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-01/why-boeings-787-dreamliner-such-piece-crap; J. Ostrower and A. Pasztor, “Boeing
Plays Down 787 Woes; Net Falls 30%,” The Wall Street Journal (January 31, 2013), p. B3; and D. Terdiman, “Boeing’s Dreamliner
Struggles Despite Tech Superiority,” C/Net (February 24, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-57385001-52/boeings-dreamliner-struggles-despite-tech-superiority/.
Questions
15-13. Do you think this is a case of the difficulty of launching new technology (there are
“bugs” in any system), or one of an unsuccessful launch?