New Products Management 11e / Crawford & Di Benedetto Part IV Development
Case Teaching Notes for Part IV
THE MINI
Chapter 13
Car design is a subject that really illustrates the potential contribution of design in the new
products process as well as the need for design to work closely with marketing and
manufacturing. As the Mini has been a very successful new product launch for BMW, it serves
as an excellent jumping-off point for this discussion and should get some students (Mini owners
or admirers) involved right away. My experience has been that if you have a Mini owner in the
class, he/she will come “loaded for bear” for this case, bringing along pamphlets, brochures,
manuals, and the like, and will be an enthusiastic contributor to the discussion!
The design of the Miata a decade earlier illustrates some of the issues very well. The
challenge was to keep the car affordable, at a retail price of about $15,000 at the time, while
incorporating the desired design changes. Other related factors included the decision to
manufacture in Japan and ship to the US (while other Mazda models were being produced in the
US on Ford/Mazda production lines), and the decision to keep production numbers low, at least
for the first few years. The rule of thumb at the time was that a new car model could not be
profitable unless 100,000 units were sold in North America; Mazda was going to keep Miata
scarce (and therefore especially desirable) and limit sales to 75,000.
Developing a whole new product platform was unnecessary, and prohibitively expensive
in any event; typically a new car platform is a half billion to a billion dollar investment. The
Miata was to be built on the same platform as the economy subcompact Mazda 323. Working
When designing the New Beetle, Volkswagen had to recreate the look and feel of the
familiar 1960s era Beetle while at the same time make it competitive (in quality and price) to the
many other small cars on the market. As the case notes, this was accomplished by updating the
Beetle look, and putting the new body on the existing Golf platform. Still, recognize the subtle
contributions of design: too much like, or too much unlike, the old Beetle might have spelled
Many of the same considerations are applicable in the case of the Mini. For one thing,
BMW had to think like Mazda: the goal was to hit a certain retail price, or else price itself out of
the very target market it was trying to reach. Working backward from this price, it was essential
that the designers work hardest on the assessment factors that make the biggest difference to
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Secondly, BMW also has a positioning decision to make here. How closely should the
BMW name be attached to the new Mini? Pros, of course, include the excellent reputation for
design and performance that comes with the BMW name. Cons include the fact that this
reputation is attached to upmarket German luxury cars, not sporty British cars. Also, BMW
As far as design is concerned, many of the same car design issues as noted in this case,
and in the text, are relevant here. Too much like the “old Mini” might not really be a problem
here, as it is unlikely that too many prospective buyers have such a perfect memory of the old
Mini (have you seen one on the road lately?). Too much unlike it would fail to live up to
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New Products Management 11e / Crawford & Di Benedetto Part IV Development
PALM PILOT
Chapter 13
The Palm Pilot case allows discussion of the importance of product design, both in establishing
the brand as the “dominant form” and in maintaining a dominant position despite competitive
challenge.
Clearly, Palm Pilot design was driven at first by the technology, and the fact that it was
basically alone in the marketplace (and it worked) almost guaranteed its success. But before
long, competition was threatening to take large shares of the market away from Palm, and for the
new generation of Palm Pilot, the firm was going to have to turn to design, not just for improving
the technology, but for being responsive to emerging customer needs. In this sense, the later
versions of Palm (such as Palm V) are obviously driven by customer needs as well as emerging
The case can be used to illustrate a dilemma often faced especially in high-tech markets.
Research supporting the Palm V suggested that customers wanted a thinner and lighter device.
That’s the easy part! The hard part is how to achieve both thinness and lightness, and sometimes
a not-so-obvious technical advancement must be made to satisfy the relatively straightforward
customer requirement. In the case of Palm V, thinness was achieved by replacing AAA batteries
Several other firms come to mind (besides Apple) that distinguish themselves in terms of
design: Braun and Krups in appliances, Lexus and Infiniti in cars, Swatch in watches, Nintendo
(Wii) in video games, and many others. Students will undoubtedly come up with even more
examples.
Maybe a word of explanation here to students who may say that the product category is
becoming obsolete in a world of smartphones. I chose to keep the case in because it is such a
great illustration of a simple, innovative new product that essentially created a new product
category, as well as the kind of focused effort required to maintain that lead. After all, even with
the first Palm Pilot selling well, what is to stop Apple, Sony, or other powerhouses of the time
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GILLETTE MACH3 AND FUSION
Chapter 13
The technical concerns in the case are certainly reasonable ones. The Mach3 technology
involved two significant technological innovations: three blades mounted at different angles to
achieve progressively closer shaves, and a patented DLC (Diamond Like Carbon) coating for
maximum strength in a thin blade. It was hard enough for Gillette to make one Mach3 blade
using this technology, let alone billions of them. The technology people at Gillette were
undoubtedly concerned about the financial investment required to make the Mach3 happen, if not
actual manufacturing feasibility. Obviously, all the marketing in the world is not going to get the
market to repeat purchase a product that is expensive and not demonstrably better than other
blades on the market. There is a reasonable fall-back position in this case: a three-blade Sensor
could be brought to market at much lower capital investment and marketing expense, and at a
lower price to customers.
The company decided that the investment in Mach3 was worth it, investing $750 million in
It essentially comes down to this question: does Gillette believe in the new technology
enough to take on the risks? For Gillette, the answer has got to be rooted in company
philosophy: they are, as noted in the case, renowned for their ability to develop and launch
leading-edge technologies to retain customers. As Robert G. King, executive vice-president of
commercial operations in the Western Hemisphere says, “Our long-term strategy has not changed
since 1905. We’ve always had a trade-up strategy by offering our customers a better performing
product. With a 70 percent value share of the U.S. market, we’re always competing with
In any event, the market proved Gillette right. The product’s promise (a closer shave with
less irritation) has made it a quick winner. The Mach3 was launched in the U.S. in July 1998, and
by early 1999 was already outselling the Sensor there by 10 to 1. Two months after the U.S.
launch, the Mach3 hit Europe, and now holds shares of over 80 percent in both Spain and the
The second part of the case describes the development and launch of the Fusion, a new
generation of Gillette blade that was designed to replace the Mach3. This one also was
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They use teams of three prominent athletes, such as golfer Tiger Woods, tennis star Roger
Federer, or baseball star Derek Jeter (this is all prior to Tiger Woods’ later scandal and the loss of
The student can be encouraged to discuss the differences between the Mach3 and Fusion
launches. The Fusion was the first new blade launched after the Gillette acquisition by Procter &
Gamble, so its success was funded by P&G money and it is likely that P&G senior management
shared Gillette Division’s enthusiasm for launching revolutionary new products every nine years
or so. It is not clear that they have tinkered at all with this strategy since the takeover.
Nevertheless, there are some details that merit discussion. Was the new blade raced out to
Note: Many of the facts and quotes presented in this case solution are derived from James
Hickman, “Razor Sharp: Adding Value, Making Noise with Mach3 Intro,” Marketing News,
March 29, 1999, pp. E4, E13.
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New Products Management 11e / Crawford & Di Benedetto Part IV Development
FORD FUSION
Chapter 14
Generally speaking, Ford seemed to use global development teams (GDTs) extremely well in the
Mondeo case. As noted, car tastes had been converging since the 1980s: North Americans were
becoming more interested in smaller cars, while a market for what we would call “compact” cars
was emerging in Japan and certain European nations (Italy and Spain being two) where tiny cars
were very popular. Thus, a market opportunity was emerging: the possibility of a real “world
car.” Ford apparently did a good job of global product development. Nevertheless, carmaking is
a complex activity, and despite Ford’s best efforts, it was never able to get sales of the Mondeo in
North Americal (where it was known as the Ford Contour/Mercury Mystique) to match the
popularity of the Mondeo in Europe and Japan. In fact, despite relatively good sales in Europe,
North American sales levels were break-even at best. It is possible that the Contour did poorly in
North America because it was poorly positioned in Ford’s North American car line (which
already offered the highly popular Taurus model). It may simply not have really fit the needs of
the North American market.
The case then discusses in detail the more recent “global car” at Ford, the Fusion. Students
familiar with this car will note that it has done well in both Europe and the U.S., suggesting that
(1) the worldwide market might indeed be ready for a “global car” at this time, and (2) Ford may
have learned something valuable from its Mondeo experiences. It is really hard to criticize the
actions of Ford in developing the Fusion, or their global car development efforts in general, as
What is striking about this case is that Ford executives discuss “global wants:” car buyers
are similar enough in their wants and needs that a global car is a reality, and a car design that can
be a leader in all key product attributes around the world is possible. Note that they are referring
here not just to design similarities (i.e., North Americans are generally wanting smaller cars than
before, while Europeans are trending to larger cars, so a Fusion-sized car could work on both
International Marketing students will get into the standardization versus adaptation debate
in discussing this case. Of course, Ford and other car makers will want to have it both ways:
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standardization as much as possible to get scale and scope economies, while adapting to regional
preferences wherever possible. The case notes an 80 percent global parts commonality,
suggesting that Ford has got far down the curve in terms of scale economies. Yet at the same
time, safety regulations can differ greatly from one market to another and Ford has been able to
achieve top safety ratings in every country where the Fusion is sold. One possible weakness of
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New Products Management 11e / Crawford & Di Benedetto Part IV Development
PROVO CRAFT
Chapter 14
The case shows the remarkable redirection of this small company from a manufacturer of simple
craft-related products to an innovative, opportunity-seeking firm with a new corporate culture
centered around creative product development, incorporating new technologies, and
social-media-inspired customer interaction.
While the case is nominally about the corporate culture at Provo Craft, it is important to
begin the discussion with a review of the strategic elements of new product development. This is
a firm that had a line of familiar, not terribly innovative products, and Jim Thornton and his
management team realized that the only way to increasing corporate growth was to rethink the
innovation process. The case outlines how company focus went from outside technology
developed by contractors to internally-developed ideas generated from market demands and
customer feedback. This is clearly a refocusing of the idea generation stage, and the case
discusses how the firm implemented a complete, in-house new products process including
succeeding stages of design specification, marketing planning, and launch. This is clearly an
adaptation of the new products process described in Chapter 2 and, apparently, the first time
Provo Craft had attempted such a new products process in their history. While the case does not
specifically discuss the product portfolio, it is clear that the new senior management wants to get
away from dependence on the traditional, tried and true products to bring in creative new
products based on customer needs and emerging technologies. This can be likened to the
rebalancing of the portfolio: at the time the case starts, Provo Craft was probably too heavily into
low-growth, old-technology products and needed to balance these with emerging,
new-technology products. Students might be encouraged to think about other strategic
dimensions to include in the portfolio, other than low-versus-high tech and low-versus-high
growth. In short, the rebirth of Provo Craft was due to their desire to “make products right”
using the new products process, as well as to “make the right products” through portfolio
considerations.
Robert Cooper’s work on new product strategy suggests that one must include
organizational issues as another strategic element of new product development, and the
importance of corporate culture is illustrated in this case. Hiring the right people starts at the top,
and Provo Craft successfully attracted Jim Colby, former senior executive of Hewlett-Packard.
Who were the new hires most in demand at Provo Craft? The firm focused on people
who were trained in the required engineering and technology skills and also had experience in
While the case does not go very deeply into all of the stages of Provo Craft’s new
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brainstorming, fueled by pizza and using sticky notes to gather and arrange ideas. This is typical,
freewheeling brainstorming; as Jim Colby said, “no idea is a bad idea.” Brainstorming is
The case details several new products recently launched by Provo Craft since the
inception of the new products process. Reading through the descriptions of the Yudu, Cricut
The students can be encouraged to pull other ideas out from the chapter to make further
recommendations to Provo Craft. For example, there is no mention of the serial innovator (a
super-innovative person who can be the stimulus behind a range of new ideas; the “Steve Jobs”
of Provo Craft, if you will). Now that Provo Craft has a track record of innovative new products,
it might be easy to identify, support, and reward this new category of innovator within the firm.
The product champion is also not mentioned. The case does speak about the close interaction
with customers; as the firm gains more experience with innovative new products, it may gain an
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PRODUCT USE TESTING FOR NEW CONSUMER NONDURABLES
Chapter 15
The students should have little difficulty thinking through the product use testing decisions
discussed in the chapter, and trying to apply them to these products. Most of them are probably
best tested without giving the subject any explanation about usage, for example. The issues of
source of product and product form are perhaps less clear – testing different package forms might
perhaps have revealed weaknesses in the calcium-fortified Special K product.
The interesting thing about the products described in this case (and something the
instructor should conclude the discussion with) is that they were all real products actually
launched into the marketplace, most of them within the past 8-10 years, and all were substantial
market failures. The NewProductWorks website, the source of the information used in this case,
is the home of the “Museum of Failed Products,” and all of these products were listed among
either recent failures or “classic” failures. For each product, extensive comments on why the
product probably failed are given. These are summarized below.
Special K: The package looked smaller than regular cereal packages, so even though
it contained the same amount of cereal, customers thought it was a poorer value.
What is learned from this case? All of these products failed in the market, and all for
reasons that should easily have been unearthed using product use analysis. Also, for the most
part, they were launched by big-name companies, that should have known better. Though we
will never know for certain, it does seem that either inadequate product use testing, or none at all,
was conducted on these products. Why? As discussed in the chapter, for a number of reasons:
Of course, students also like stories of utter failures, and this website lists some of the
true classics. You can encourage the students to visit this website and develop their own list of
“do’s and don’ts” for new products, or (if you have the equipment in your classroom) to visit the
site in class and get a discussion going on this topic. Some of the other product failures from this
cite but not used in this case include:
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“Hey! There’s a Monster in My Room” spray — a bubble-gum-scented room freshener
Clairol “Look of Buttermilk” shampoo — which begs the question, what is the look of
With these and similar products that just leave you scratching your head, one can only
Garlic cake, anyone?
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New Products Management 11e / Crawford & Di Benedetto Part IV Development
Course Concepts for Part IV
These are the primary concepts that students should take from Part IV. As stated before, the
choice of concepts is personal, and each instructor is encouraged to develop his/her own list.
1. Team-plus-leader idea, and why teams today.
2. The building of a new products team, and its components.
3. Integrators-receptors-isolates.
4. The five basic options in organizing for new products, and choosing between them.
5. Projectization, and what it means to a team manager.
6. The common roles or participants in new products work, especially champion and
sponsor.
7. The role of top management.
8. The nature of functional interface friction, its causes and cures.
9. Coupling.
10. Networking.
11. Services, and how their development differs from that for goods.
12. The impact of global economy on product development.
13. Design as a force in product development.
14. The design process, players and actions.
15. The four basic principles that drive a technical development program.
16. The role for leadership.
17. The role for culture.
18. Accelerated product development, why and how.
19. The “drivens:” design driven, engineering driven, marketing driven.
20. Product use testing for services.
21. Beta and gamma testing.
22. Using the 13 decisions to craft a product use test plan.
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