Chapter 20 – Management Compensation, Business Analysis, and Business Valuation
20–13
20-3. Economic Value Added; Review of Chapter 18; Strategy
(Adapted from teaching note prepared by the case writer, Paul Dierks, Wake Forest University)
1. Economic Value Added, or EVA, is a measure of financial performance that combines the familiar
concept of residual income with principles of modern corporate finance NI⎯specifically, that all capital
has a cost and that earning more than the cost of capital creates value for shareholders. EVA is after-tax
net operating profit (NOPAT) minus cost of capital. If a company’s return on capital exceeds its cost of
capital, it is creating true value for shareholders. Companies consistently generating high EVAs are top
performers that are highly valued by shareholders.
How does EVA stack up against the conventional financial measures of performance? Advocates
of EVA are quick to point out that financial measures based on reported accounting earnings ⎯ earnings
growth, earnings per share, and return ratios calculated on either investment, equity or assets ⎯ are
misleading measures of corporate performance. This is based on their view that accountants place their
primary emphasis on placating the interests of a firm’s lenders in order to provide a conservative
assessment of the firm’s liquidation value. Thus, the quality of reported earnings are diminished by
various financial accounting rules, like incorporating charge-offs of such value-building capital outlays as
R&D and bookkeeping entries that have little to do with recurring cash flow. This group also feels that
many investors may be fooled by accounting “shenanigans,” but investors who matter are not misled.
They know that stock prices are set by a select group of “lead steers” who look through misleading
accounting results to arrive at true values. Although blissfully ignorant of why the price is right, the rest
of the “herd” is well protected by the lead steers’ informed judgments.
One comparison is to the standard accounting return on common equity (ROE), which is
generally understood and easily calculated by dividing net income available to common stockholders by
the amount of accounting equity capital. However, ROE suffers from distortions of accounting earnings
by, among other things, expensing R&D, selecting LIFO or FIFO for inventory costing, recording
acquisitions as a purchase or a pooling, and burying recurring cash flows generated from operations in
reserves because of accrual accounting methods.
Also, ROE reacts to changes in the debt-to-equity mix a company employs and in the rate of
interest it pays on its debts, making it difficult to determine if ROE rises or falls for operating or financial
reasons without examining the return on assets and the firm’s debt–to-equity ratio. With ROE as its goal,
management may be tempted to accept substandard projects that happen to be financed with debt and pass
by very good ones that are financed with equity. To avoid such situations, managers shouldn’t associate
sources of funds with the uses of those funds. Such association distorts the desirability of undertaking a
project by mixing operating and financing decisions. Instead, all projects should be thought of as being
financed with a target blend of debt and equity no matter how they might indeed be financed. Moreover,
by focusing just on ROE, managers may pass up good (wealth creating) projects that are safer than the
average assets of the firm because the return on the project would lower the firm’s ROE. Similarly,
managers may take on bad (wealth reducing) projects that are riskier than the average asset of the firm
because the project’s return increases the firm’s ROE. It should be kept in mind that by focusing on ROE,
the manager ignores the risk associated with a specific project and hence the appropriate return needed for
that investment.
An alternative measure of performance is return on assets (ROA), but it too ignores the cost of
capital, which can lead a firm to make decisions that reduce economic value. For example, IBM, in its
most profitable year, had a return on assets that was over 11 %, but its cost of capital was almost 13 %.
Assuming their cost of capital remains at 13 %, accepting projects with risks similar to existing assets, but
with a return below 13 %, reduces shareholder value.
Another comparison to make is against earnings per share (EPS). In contrast to EVA, EPS tells
little about the cost of generating those profits. Since EPS is directly influenced by the amount of earnings
relative to the number of shares outstanding, financing new investments through debt capital can increase
EPS. Large or rapid earnings growth can be manufactured by pouring capital into riskier projects; earning
an adequate rate of return relative to risk is far more important than growing rapidly. Thus, at best, EPS