Chapter 12 – Strategy and the Analysis of Capital Investments
12–99
12–60 (Continued-2)
support of innovation investments. In committing this error, such managers fail to
make the same investments that new entrants and attackers find to be profitable.
One possibility for dealing with the above-mentioned problem is to view the
competitive not useable life of the assets being contemplated. While the latter is
to as valuing a strategy rather than a project.
3. The authors suggest that bias in the evaluation of innovation projects is
caused, as well, by an overemphasis on (short-term) earnings per share
statistics. What is the essence of this argument? What do the authors propose
as a recommendation for addressing this problem?
The authors suggest that many managers focus too narrowly on (short-term)
earnings per share and earnings-per-share growth metrics, under the (misguided)
assumption that these numbers are inherently linked to share price and therefore
shareholder value-creation. In part, this bias may be attributable to the desire to have
a simple quantitative indicator that is easily compared period–to-period and across
companies. In part, it may be attributable to the fact that there is some relationship
incentive-compensation plans for many executives, the authors suggest the need to
reexamine this paradigm. Fundamentally, they question the assumption of the need
to tie incentive compensation to long-term stock appreciation. Unfortunately, they do
not propose a viable alternative. They suggest only that the underlying logic of
conventional wisdom in this regard should be challenged. For example, they suggest
that because today many shareowners are not really shareholders, increased
emphasis on short-term earnings performance actually better aligns agent actions
with the objectives of principals. This, of course, is interesting “food for thought”!