Chapter 10 – Strategy and the Master Budget
10–60 Criticisms of Traditional Budgeting/Incentive Issues (45 Minutes)
Many critics of conventional budgeting procedures cite dysfunctional consequences of
using fixed-performance budgets in managerial compensation contracts. These
individuals believe, among other problems, that such contracts motivate managers and
employees to “game the performance indicator,” that is, to take actions that improve the
performance indicator but are not value-adding to the organization. The following are
selected examples of “gaming behavior”:
• managing earnings by pushing expenses into the future (e.g., by delaying
purchases, delay making new hires, delaying an important product-development
initiative, or delaying needed expenditures)
• “channel stuffing” (or “trade loading”)—that is, shipping excessive amounts of
products to distributors to meet near-term sales goals, recognizing that many
such products are likely to be returned; such items are sometimes referred to as
“sale–or–return” products
• announcing price hikes for the next fiscal year, in an attempt to motivate
increases in end-of-current-year sales
• shifting funds between accounts to avoid budget overruns (costly, non-value-
added managerial activity)
Other dysfunctional consequences of traditional fixed-performance reward systems
include the following:
• negotiating low targets and high rewards (i.e., pushing for targets that are
inwardly comfortable yet appear outwardly difficult to achieve)
• spending whatever is in your budget (“use it or lose it”)
• intentionally asking for more resources than you need, anticipating that