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Chapter 04 Appendix
Chapter 04 Appendix
McConnell Brue Flynn 20e
APPENDIX DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Because medical records are private, an individual applying for health insurance will know
more about his own health conditions than will the insurance companies to which he is applying
for coverage. Is this likely to increase or decrease the insurance premium that he will be offered?
Why? LO6
Answer: This will likely increase the insurance premium because the buyers of the
insurance policy have more information about their health status than the sellers (the
2. Why is it in the interest of new homebuyers and builders of new homes to have government
building codes and building inspectors? LO6
Answer: The reason is related to the lack of information and education on the part
of most new homebuyers and builders with regard to every aspect of home
3. Place an “M” beside the items in the following list that describe a moral hazard problem and an
“A” beside those that describe an adverse selection problem. LO6
a. A person with a terminal illness buys several life insurance policies through the mail.
b. A person drives carelessly because she has automobile insurance.
c. A person who intends to torch his warehouse takes out a large fire insurance policy.
d. A professional athlete who has a guaranteed contract fails to stay in shape during the off-
season.
e. A woman who anticipates having a large family takes a job with a firm that offers exceptional
childcare benefits.
4A-1
Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written
consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Chapter 04 Appendix
Answer: (a) This is an adverse selection problem. The buyer of the insurance policy has
(b) This is a moral hazard problem. The person changes their behavior after the insurance
(c) This is an adverse selection problem. The buyer of the insurance policy has more
(d) This is a moral hazard problem. The person changes his or her behavior after the
(e) This is an adverse selection problem. The woman has more information about her
APPENDIX REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. People drive faster when they have auto insurance. This is an example of: LO6
a. Adverse selection.
b. Asymmetric information.
c. Moral hazard.
Answer: c, Moral hazard
People driving faster when they have auto insurance is an example of moral
hazard. This is true because moral hazard is the tendency of one party to a
2. Government inspectors who check on the quality of services provided by retailers as
well as government requirements for licensing in various professions are both attempts to
resolve: LO6
a. The moral hazard problem.
b. The asymmetric information problem.
This is true because the government inspectors and professional licensing are
3. True or False: A market may collapse and have relatively few transactions between buyers and
sellers if buyers have more information than sellers. LO6
4A-2
Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written
consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Chapter 04 Appendix
4A-3
Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written
consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Chapter 04 Appendix
Answer: True
This statement is true because when buyers have more information than sellers, sellers
must worry that buyers will take advantage of them. The standard example of this
phenomenon is health insurance, because individuals almost always have better
information about their own health conditions than insurance companies. This causes a
APPENDIX PROBLEMS
1. Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what
their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential
buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be
a low-quality “lemon.” LO6
a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that
good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad used cars are worth $5,000. What is the
average value of a used car?
b. By how much does the average value exceed the value of a bad used car? By how
much does the value of a good used car exceed the average value?
c. Would a potential seller of a good used car be willing to accept the average value as
payment for her vehicle?
d. If a buyer negotiates with a seller to purchase the seller’s used car for a price equal to
the average, is the car more likely to be good or bad?
e. Will the used-car market come to feature mostly, if not exclusively, lemons? How
much will used cars end up costing if all the good cars are withdrawn?
4A-4
Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written
consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Chapter 04 Appendix
Feedback: Consider the following example for the different parts below.
Part a:
Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that
good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad used cars are worth $5,000. What is the
average value of a used car?
Since there are an equal number of good and bad used cars in the market the likelihood of
Part b:
By how much does the average value exceed the value of a bad used car? By how much
does the value of a good used car exceed the average value?
The average value of a used car exceeds the value of a bad used car by $4,000 (=$9,000-
Part c:
Part d:
If a buyer negotiates with a seller to purchase the seller’s used car for a price equal to the
average value, is the car more likely to be good or bad?
Part e:
Will the used car market come to feature mostly—if not exclusively—lemons? How
much will used cars end up costing if that all the good cars are withdrawn?
Yes, this market will come to feature mostly, if not exclusively, lemons. If all the good
4A-5
Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written
consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
