Chapter Fifteen
Environmental Law
A MANAGERS DILEMMA: PUTTING IT INTO PRACTICE
Exporting Environmental Compliance
Issues Presented: (a) What factors should a corporation take into account before relocating a
polluting factory to a nonregulating country? (b) What alternatives are there besides
relocation?
(a) As polluting industries come under increasing regulation in industrial nations, the
resulting trend is to export the polluting processes to nonregulating countries. So-called
“runaway shops” then market their products in industrial nations with the competitive
advantage of not having to comply with the pollution-control regulations.
In deciding whether to re-locate industrial factories to nonregulating countries,
companies must weigh several factors. The international trade impacts of pollution export
(b) Instead of relocating, American Widgets could promote higher international
regulatory standards for waste disposal or work with an international standard-setting
QUESTIONS AND CASE PROBLEMS
Question 1
Issues Presented: (a) Is recovery of costs under RCRA and other statutes possible when the
offending actions took place prior to the effective date of the statutes? (b) Are individuals
who act on behalf of a corporation individually liable for violations of RCRA and other
statutes? (c) Can suit be brought against a corporation that has been liquidated?
(a) The court in United States v. Northeastern Pharm. and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), gave RCRA and CERCLA retroactive effect. Therefore, parties engaging in activities that
(b) NEPACCO was held liable for its actions under RCRA and CERCLA. Additionally,
Lee was found individually responsible under RCRA and CERCLA because he personally
(c) Even though NEPACCO had been liquidated, the court found that the corporation
could still be sued because it has not been dissolved. Rather, NEPACCO has merely lost its
Question 2
Issues Presented: (a) Do environmental laws apply to nonprofit organizations? (b) What
should a purchaser of property do to avoid potential environmental liability associated with
the acquisition?
(a) Environmental laws apply to both profit and nonprofit organizations. To protect his
organization from potential liability, George Lu should establish comprehensive due diligence
(b) To protect the association from environmental law liability, Lu will want to shift the
risk of bearing the cost of any environmental harm to parties other than the association. Lu
Question 3
Issue Presented: Is an entity’s mere knowledge that its hazardous product would be spilled
and leaked by a subsequent user of that product sufficient to prove that the entity “arranged
for” the disposal under CERCLA?
CERCLA imposes liability for environmental contamination upon four classes of
potentially responsible parties (PRPs). Relevant to the case at hand, CERCLA imposes liability
upon
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
Because CERCLA does not specifically define what it means to “arrang[e] for” disposal,
the Court gave the phrase its ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of the word “arrange,”
noted the Court, implies “action directed to a specific purpose.” Therefore, in order for Shell to
qualify as an arranger, it “must have entered into the sale of [the chemical] with the intention
that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process by one or more
Question 4
Issue Presented: To what extent do secured lenders face CERCLA liability for the
environmental violations of their borrowers?
CERCLA holds the owner or operator of a facility containing hazardous waste strictly
liable for the expenses incurred in responding to the environmental and health hazards posed
by the waste in the facility. CERCLA contains exceptions to the broad liability for owners, one
The appeals court approved of the district court’s decision to draw a distinction between
the City of Florence’s decision to acquire the property to spur industrial development and its
decision to retain title to the property to ensure that the bonds were backed by adequate
security. The court stated:
[G]overnments acquire property to further some public purpose, be it economic
development, environmental protection, or flood control. Once those public
Question 5
Issues Presented: (a) How does the manager of a new company ensure compliance with
environmental laws? (b) To what extent do officers of a company face personal liability for
the pollution violations of that company? (c) How should a manager respond to
intracompany environmental violations?
(a) Environmental law is both complex and elaborate. As CEO of a new biotech
company, Gregg Entrepreneur will almost certainly be too involved in the operational aspects
of the enterprise to research personally all legal requirements for compliance. Environmental
(b) Federal environmental laws hold liable both owners and operators of hazardous
waste facilities. Corporate officers who are involved in the day-to-day operation of a facility
(c) Entrepreneur should obviously put an end to the violations and immediately fire the
production manager. In addition, he must revise the organization policies so that the VP of
operations exercises better oversight of the waste disposal practices. Entrepreneur is legally
Question 6
Issue Presented: Can a creditor that formerly owned 20% of the stock in a company that ran
and operated a mine be successfully sued as a responsible party under CERCLA?
This hypothetical is based on Raytheon Constructors, Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d 1214 (10th
Cir. 2003). In the actual case, Biller Company was Raytheon Constructors, Inc., formerly
The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Bestfoods that “an operator must manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations.” The Supreme Court acknowledged that directors and officers might hold
The Tenth Circuit in Raytheon found that Stearns did indeed wear two hats as president
of Biller and as president and chair of RMI. But the appeals court concluded that the district
court erred in concluding that he was acting on behalf of Biller rather than RMI: “[S]erving as
the primary liaison between two corporations does not rebut the presumption of wearing
separate hats in separate corporate roles. . . . Indeed, none of these facts rebut the Bestfoods
Note that a suit against Stearns personally might result in his being found liable as an arranger
and operator.
Question 7
Issue Presented: Is a company a responsible party under CERCLA if another party spills
waste that, without the fault of the first firm, flows onto its property?
The court rejected NMPC’s theory that MVO was responsible because it owned or
operated a facility at the time the hazardous substances were disposed of by TAS, explaining:
The critical facts are that the trucks were cleaned and rinsed on the TAS
property, after which the contaminants flowed onto [MVO’s property] to the
With respect to the passage of the contaminants over or through MVO’s property, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that it had not been established that
hazardous wastes were “disposed of” at MVO’s property within the meaning of the statute:
“Disposal” is defined as the “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing.” It cannot be said that any of these things were done on
MVO’s property. What happened on MVO’s property in the relevant time was
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss NMPC’s CERCLA
contribution claim against MVO, because no disposal occurred on MVO’s land.
Question 8
Issue Presented: Does Mr. Villegas’s conduct amount to a “discharge” under the Clean Water
Act? Is he, a human being, a “point source” within the meaning of the act?
The Clean Water Act makes unlawful “the discharge of any pollutant by any person
. . . .” 33 U.S.C. Section 1311(a). “Pollutant” is defined, in part, as “biological materials . . .
discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C. Section 1362(6). “Discharge,” in turn, is “any addition of any
The issue before the court in U.S. v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2nd Cir.
1993), was whether Mr. Villegas’s conduct constituted a “discharge” under the Clean Water Act.
To determine the scope of the Clean Water Act’s definition of “point source,” the court
first considered the language and structure of the act itself. The court explained:
Human beings are not among the enumerated items that may be a “point
source.” Although by its terms the definition of “point source” is
nonexclusive, the words used to define the term and the examples given
(“pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,” etc.) evoke
images of physical structures and instrumentalities that systematically act
as a means of conveying pollutants from an industrial source to navigable
waterways.
The court next observed that the legislative history of the act provided “little insight” to
the meaning of the term “point source,” but only confirmed the act’s focus on industrial
polluters. Similarly, case law urging a broad interpretation of the definition in the civil-penalty