“challenge to the utilitarian mindset so prevalent today.” By this, he means that in
many facets of modern life, from our military interventions to our economic system,
we tend to treat people in a utilitarian fashion, assuming that they exist as objects to
serve our societal ends, and this can have arguably tragic consequences. Despite our
“moral imperative” to view everyone as equally worthy of life, many are still sacri-
ficed—in what Brooks calls “tragic trade offs”—to supply the “greatest good for the
greatest number” of people or to develop the most sophisticated weapons of war. Ex-
ploitation offers a similar lens through which we, like Brooks, might read Le Guin’s
story, particularly when we consider how many U.S. companies outsource labor to
countries with less rigorous labor laws. Readers on the West Coast or in the South
might even reference the current agricultural scene, in which thousands of migrants,
including young children, labor for long hours with little pay and poor living condi-
tions during the harvest and planting seasons—all to maintain consumers’ preferred
In “The Error of Trying to Measure Good and Bad,” academic John Ehrenfeld
critiques David Brooks’s assumption that utilitarianism can be at all rationalized in our
understanding of and perhaps identification with the citizens of Le Guin’s “Omelas.”
Ehrenfeld argues that those who remain in Omelas are indeed “bad,” because they
have traded off these moral categories. Accepting and rationalizing the system does not
then make the system OK. In response to Brooks, Ehrenfeld embraces Kant’s argu-
ment that we should under no circumstances treat human beings as means—only as
ends. He connects this to a duty-based ethics, such as Judaism’s commitment to lov-
ing-kindness.
However, such an approach is a bit complicated when one considers that “ration-
ality” is not universally shared, and its definition not universally agreed upon. If our
conceptions of what the categorical imperative looks like are derived from our own
culture, our experiences, our education, and so on, it is not unthinkable that people in
other parts of the world might have different ways of treating others. Ehrenfeld ignores
the potential complications of assuming a universal ethics, complications with which
those in animal rights and environmental activism, for example, are very familiar.
Ehrenfeld further argues that Brooks has missed the main point of Le Guin’s sto-
ry, which is that people must choose between different categories of ethics. This, he
explains, is not unlike the situation the U.S. finds itself in today; the founding fathers’
attention to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness reflects just such a juxtaposition
of ethical categories, one that we tend to ignore. In making “bad” another value to be