CHAPTER 7
MAKING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS WORK
CHAPTER OUTLINE
I. OPENING CASE: Emerging Markets: Etihad Airways’ Alliance Network
A. Etihad Airways is the fastest growing airline in the history of commercial aviation
1. It was founded in 2003 and based in Abu Dhabi
million passengers to more than 100 cities
B. Etihad imitates the highly successful Emirates by
1. equipping itself with modern long-haul jets (such as Airbus A380 and Boeing 777
Extended Range [ER])
2. leveraging the enviable location of the Abu Dhabi International Airport, which is only
an hour away by car from Dubai’s storied airport
shy or does not care about collaboration
1. Airlines are no strangers to alliances, but Etihad has built its own alliance network
consisting of eight smaller airlines
a. A 29% equity in Air Berlin, Europe’s sixth-largest airline
b. 4% equity in Dublin, Ireland-based Aer Lingus
c. 49% in Rome, Italy-based Alitalia (the largest airline in Italy)
d. 49% in Belgrade, Serbia-based Air Serbia
E. Etihad CEO James Hogan is an Australian who bailed out a bunch of money-losing or
cash-poor airlines, including Ireland, Italy, Serbia, and Seychelles
1. Hogan’s investments in airlines that serve smaller markets made economic sense by
increasing Etihad’s passenger tally and securing economies of scale when competing
with Emirates
2. The most challenging member is Alitalia, which lost €1.1 trillion (US$1.5 billion) in
five years, and Etihad spent €560 million to breathe some new life into it
II. DEFINING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS
A. Strategic alliances are “voluntary agreements between firms involving exchanging,
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sharing, or co-developing of products, technologies, or services.”
B. Strategic alliances also represent compromises between short-term, pure market
transactions (such as spot transactions) and long-term, complete ownership solutions
(such as mergers and acquisitions [M&As]. Also see Chapter 9)
C. Alliances fall into two broad categories: contractual (non-equity) and equity-based
D. Strategic networks are defined as strategic alliances formed by multiple firms to compete
against other such groups and against traditional single firms
1. The three multipartner alliances in the airline industry—Star Alliance (consisting of
United Airlines, Lufthansa, Air Canada, SAS, and others), Sky Team (Delta, Air
France, Korean Air, and others), and Oneworld (American Airlines, British Airways,
Cathay Pacific, Qantas, and others)—are strategic networks, which are sometimes
also called constellations
2. Overall, the terms “strategic alliances” and “strategic networks” are used to refer to
cooperative interfirm relationships
III. A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS
A. Industry-Based Considerations
1. Traditional industry-based view, firms are independent players interested in
maximizing their own performance
2. The dynamic of five forces of firms’ alliance and network ties
a. Horizontal alliances: By forming strategic alliances, firms do not compete against
each other on all occasions, which are often likely to reduce profits
B. Resource-Based Considerations
1. The resource-based view is embodied in the VRIO framework, which are value, rarity,
imitability, and organizational aspect of strategic alliance and networks
2. Value
a. Strategic alliances and networks must create value
b. Advantages of strategic alliances and networks that add value
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c. Disadvantages of strategic alliances and networks
3. Rarity
a. Two dimensions: capability rarity and partner rarity
b. Relational (collaborative) capabilities
(i) Refer to the capabilities to successfully manage interfirm relationships
(ii) Managers involved in alliances and networks require relationship skills which
foster trust with partners while at the same time guarding against opportunism
c. Partner rarity
(i) Defined as the difficulty to locate partners with certain desirable attributes due
to industry structure and network position
(ii) From the view of industry structure, in many oligopolistic industries, the
number of available players as potential partners is limited
(iii)From the perspective of network position, firms located in the center of
interfirm networks may accumulate more power and influence due to the their
access to better and more opportunities
4. Imitability
a. Involves two levels: firm level and alliance/network level
b. A firm’s resources and capabilities may be imitated by partners
c. Successful alliances and networks are often based on socially complex relations
among partners, which makes it very difficult for members of rival alliances and
networks to observe and outperform
5. Organization
a. At firm level, how firms are organized to benefit from alliances and networks is
C. Institution-Based Considerations
1. Formal regulatory pillar (collusion concerns and entry requirements)
a. Strategic alliances and networks function within a set of formal legal and
regulatory frameworks which impact
(i) Antitrust concerns
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(a) Explicit collusion between competitors to fix prices is anticompetitive and
banned by antitrust authorities
(b) Cooperation between rivals is usually suspected of some tacit collusion
2. Informal normative pillar (the social pressures to find partners)
a. Since firms act to enhance or protect their legitimacy, copying other reputable
organizations may be a low-cost way to gain legitimacy, even without knowing
the direct performance benefits of doing so
b. Business press, investment community, and board deliberations exert informal but
powerful normative pressures to late-move firms to ally with obscure partners as
opposed to having no partner
IV. FORMATION
A. Stage One: To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate?
1. A firm must decide if growth can be achieved strictly through market transactions,
acquisitions, or alliances
2. To grow by pure market transactions, the firm has to confront competitive challenges
independently; highly demanding even for resource-rich multinationals
B. Stage Two: Contract or Equity?
1. A firm must decide to take a contract or an equity approach
2. Four driving forces determine this
a. Shared capabilities
(i) The more tacit the capabilities, the greater the preference for equity
involvement
(ii) The more effective way to learn a complex process is through learning by
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d. Institutional constraints
(i) Some governments eager to help domestic firms climb the technology ladder
either require or encourage the formations of JVs between foreign and
domestic firms
C. Stage Three : Positioning the Relationship
V. EVOLUTION
A. Combating Opportunism
1. Most firms want to make their relationship work, but also want to protect themselves
in case the other side is opportunistic
2. Possible ways to minimize the threat of opportunism
B. Evolving from Strong Ties to Weak Ties
1. Strong ties are more durable, reliable, and trustworthy relationships cultivated over a
long period of time
a. Two advantages
(i) Strong ties are associated with exchanging finer-grained, higher quality
information
(ii) Strong ties serve as an informal, social control mechanism that is an
alternative to formal contracts for combating opportunism, as formal contracts
are often perceived as a lack of trust and thus undermine collaboration
2. Weak ties are defined as relationships that are characterized by infrequent interaction
and low intimacy
3. Firms are likely to have a combination of strong ties and weak ties in their interfirm
relationships
4. Benefits of the different types of ties depend on the firms’ strategies—exploitation or
exploration
a. Exploitation refers to such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency,
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5. Many interfirm relationships evolve from an emphasis on strong ties to a focus on
C. From Corporate Marriage to Divorce
1. Alliances are often described as corporate marriages, and when terminated, as
corporate divorces
2. A two-partner alliance can be used to understand the metaphor of divorce
a. The party who begins the process of ending the alliance is labeled the initiator
b. The other party is termed the partner
VI. PERFORMANCE
A. The Performance of Strategic Alliances and Networks
1. A combination of objective and subjective measures can be used to determine
2. Four factors may influence the performance of alliances and networks:
a. Equity
(i) A lower level of equity contribution may indicate a firm’s relative lack of
commitment and attention
(ii) A higher level of equity stake indicates that a firm has stronger interest,
higher-quality resources committed, stronger bargaining power, and better
opportunities for monitoring and control, which are likely to result in high
performance
b. Learning and experience
(i) When assessing alliance/network performance, it is important to see if firms
have successfully learned from their partners’ features
(ii) However, an increase in the experience of one partner may bring instability
into the relationship as it reduces the need to rely on the other partner
c. Nationality
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d. Relational capabilities
(i) Soft, hard-to-measure relational capabilities
(ii) Firm-specific and difficult to codify, describe and transfer, may make or break
the interfirm relationship
B. The Performance of Parent Firms
1. A higher level of collaboration and shared technology is associated with better
profitability and more product market share for parent firms
2. Stock market responds favorably to alliance activities, but only under certain
circumstances
VII. DEBATES AND EXTENSIONS
A. Majority JVs as Control Mechanisms versus Minority JVs as Real Options
1. Although a higher level of equity control can be beneficial to firms, its actual
implementation is often problematic
a. Asserting one party’s control rights, even when justified based on a majority
equity position and stronger bargaining power, may irritate the other party
a. The more uncertain the conditions, the higher the value of real options
B. Alliance versus Acquisitions
1. An alternative to alliances is M&As
a. Many firms seem to pursue M&As and alliances in isolation
2. It may be advisable to consider alliances vis-à-vis acquisitions within a single
decision framework
3. Resource interdependence
a. High for acquisitions, low for alliances
C. Acquiring versus Not Acquiring Alliance Partners
1. Alliance partners with a high degree of network centrality benefit from being
centrally located in a network of players
2. One debate deals with whether such centrally located firms should acquire other more
peripheral and typically smaller alliance partners in the network
3. Research involving U.S. and Chinese firms reveals interesting contrasts
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a. In the United States, centrally located firms in an alliance network seem to enjoy
the benefits of high centrality and are not eager to acquire alliance partners
b. However, in China, centrally located firms, to derive benefits from their high
4. Used to their dynamic and fast-moving domestic competition, firms from emerging
economies may be interested in aggressively and quickly acquiring partner firms
overseas—out of fear that any competitive advantage associated with the acquisition
moves may erode rapidly if they do not act quickly
5. Two lessons that can be learned from this debate are
a. Alliance partner firms in developed economies need to get used to the more
“rapid fire” acquisitions initiated by firms in emerging economies
b. Firms from developed economies need to speed up their partner acquisition
process when competing in emerging economies
VIII. THE SAVVY STRATEGIST
A. The strategic horizon has expanded from how a single firm strategizes to highlighting
interfirm strategy
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CHAPTER SEVEN – LECTURE NOTES AND TEACHING TIPS
SUMMARY OF THE OPENING CASE: Emerging Markets: Etihad Airways’ Alliance
Network
The opening case discusses the mutual strategies of Etihad Airways and Emirates Airways to be
“super–connector airlines.” The two airlines differ, however, in their involvement in alliance
networks and purchasing troubled or failing airlines.
Teaching Tip: Ask students to discuss how two airlines based in countries with relatively small
populations can grow to be among the largest in the world. Why would Etihad acquire European
airlines, particularly financially troubled ones? What does the airline hope to accomplish? Ask
students if they agree or disagree with Michael O’Leary (Ryanair CEO) and his assessment that
Etihad has only bought “trash.”
DEFINING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS
Strategic alliances are “voluntary agreements between firms involving exchanging, sharing, or
co–developing of products, technologies, or services,” and then selling those products or services.
Alliances fall into two broad categories: contractual (non-equity) and equity-based.
Contractual alliances include co-marketing, research and development (R&D) contracts, turnkey
projects, strategic suppliers, strategic distributors, and licensing/franchising (see Chapter 6 for
definitions). These are also limited in scope and duration.
Networks are also a form of strategic alliance. For the purposes of this chapter, we define
strategic networks as strategic alliances formed by multiple firms to compete against other such
groups and against traditional single firms.
For example, three multipartner alliances in the airline industry are strategic networks —Star
Alliance (consisting of United Airlines, Lufthansa, Air Canada, SAS, and others), Sky Team
(Delta, Air France, Korean Air, and others), and One World (American Airlines, British Airways,
Cathay Pacific, Qantas, and others.
A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS
The decision to engage in alliances and networks is a set of strategic considerations drawn from
the three leading perspectives on strategy discussed in earlier chapters.
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Industry-Based Considerations – Alliances and the Five Forces
Because rivalry often reduces profits, firms do not compete against each other on all occasions.
Instead, many competitors collaborate by forming strategic alliances (often called horizontal
alliances). BMW and Mercedes are collaborating on green car technology.
Teaching Tip: Students will likely be very familiar with Amazon.com. Amazon’s demise was
regularly predicted right after (and even during) the dotcom boom. The argument was that
“anyone” could duplicate what Amazon does and sell books or anything else over the Internet.
Yet anyone who has any experience ordering over the Internet, more than a dozen years into the
Internet’s commercial history, knows that “anyone” cannot imitate Amazon. The students can be
asked why firms such as Target, Nordstrom, and Toys R Us prefer to sell through Amazon’s
website rather than by setting up their own sites.
Finally, the market potential of substitute products may encourage firms to form strategic
alliances and networks to materialize the commercial potential of these new products. For
instance, smartphones developed by the Android alliance centered on Google and its partners
such as HTC and Samsung have now substituted some personal computers (PC).
Resource-Based Considerations
Value
Strategic alliances and networks must create value. There are several broad categories of
advantages that add value.
First, relative to relying on pure market transactions and/or M&As, strategic alliances and
networks may reduce costs, risks, and uncertainties. The three global airline networks, for
example, reduce ticket costs booked on two-stage flights by 18 to 28 percent compared with
separate flights on the same route if these airlines were not allied.
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Disadvantages
First, there is always the possibility of being stuck with the wrong partner. A second possible
disadvantage is partner opportunism. For example, BP’s JV partners in Russia alleged that BP
Rarity
The second component in the VRIO framework is rarity, which has two dimensions: (1)
capability rarity and (2) partner rarity.
Managers involved in alliances and networks require relationship skills rarely covered in the
traditional business school curriculum (Henry Mintzberg in particular has argued that MBA
programs that emphasizes competition as opposed to collaboration and softer managerial skills
are all too common, and a weakness of the current MBA model).
As much as alliances and networks represent a strategic and economic arrangement, they also
constitute a social, psychological, and emotional phenomenon: words such as “courtship,”
“marriage,” and “divorce” often surface. Firms with these rare relational capabilities, such as
Sweden’s IKEA and Ericsson, naturally try to leverage them.
Imitability
The issue of imitability pertains to two levels: (1) firm level and (2) alliance/network level. First,
as noted earlier, one firm’s resources and capabilities may be imitated by partners. For instance,
in the late 1980s, McDonald’s set up a JV with the Moscow Municipality Government, which
helped it enter Russia. However, during the 1990s, the Moscow mayor set up a rival fast food
chain, The Bistro, which replicated numerous McDonald’s products, practices, and processes.
Another issue pertaining to the imitability of strategic alliances and networks stems from their
complexity. Successful alliances and networks are often based on socially complex relations
among partners, which makes it very difficult for members of rival alliances and networks to
observe and out-compete.
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Organization
Similarly, the organizational issues also affect both the firm level and the alliance/network level.
First, at the firm level, how firms are organized to benefit from alliances and networks is an
important issue.
Institution-Based Considerations
Because institutions that govern economic activities include both formal and informal constraints
supported by regulatory and normative/cognitive pillars, respectively, this section examines them
in turn.
Formal Institutions Supported by Regulatory Pillars
Strategic alliances and networks function within a set of formal legal and regulatory frameworks.
These formal institutions impact (1) antitrust (or collusion) concerns and (2) entry mode
requirements.
Because the integration and coordination within alliances/networks are usually not as tight as
those in full acquisitions of competitors (which would eliminate one competitor), antitrust
authorities are more likely to approve alliances/networks than acquisitions. Another way formal
institutions affect strategic alliances and networks is through formal requirements imposed on
foreign market entry modes (see also Chapter 6). In many countries, governments have
discouraged or simply banned WOSs, which leaves some sort of alliances with local firms as the
only equity-based entry choice for foreign firms. This often depends on the firm’s industry
Informal Institutions Supported by Normative and Cognitive Pillars
The first set of informal institutions centers on collective norms, supported by a normative pillar.
The institutional perspective suggests that because firms act to enhance or protect their
legitimacy, copying other reputable organizations—even without knowing the direct
performance benefits of doing so—may be a low-cost way to gain legitimacy.
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FORMATION
The process of forming strategic alliances and networks can be illustrated by a three-stage
managerial decision model.
Stage One: To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate?
In Stage One, the firm makes a strategic choice concerning whether to form cooperative
interfirm relationships or to rely on pure market transactions or acquisitions to grow the firm.
Some firms prefer to pursue an acquisition, though they are fraught with hazards (see Chapter 9).
Others prefer the flexibility of strategic alliances and networks.
Stage Two: Contract or Equity?
First, what is the type of shared of resources and capabilities? The more tacit, the more likely
firms will prefer equity involvement. Conversely, the easier it is to specify the shared resources
and capabilities, the more likely firms will pursue contractual agreements. Much tacit knowledge
can only be acquired by doing, preferably with those that are masters of their domains.
Stage Three: Positioning the Relationship
Although forming strategic alliances has historically been assumed to occur between two
partners, the proliferation of interfirm relationships suggests that such thinking may need to be
expanded to prevent an “alliance gridlock,” carefully assessing the impact of each individual
relationship on the firm’s other relationships prior to its formation is increasingly important. In
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EVOLUTION
This section highlights three aspects of relationship evolution (1) combating opportunism, (2)
evolving from strong ties to weak ties, and (3) going through a divorce.
Combating Opportunism
The threat of opportunism looms large on the horizon. Most firms want to make their
relationship work, but also want to protect themselves in case the other side is opportunistic.
While it is difficult to completely eliminate opportunism, it is possible to minimize its threat by
walling off critical capabilities or swapping critical capabilities through credible commitments.
First, both sides can contractually agree to wall off critical skills and technologies not meant to
be shared. For example, GE and SNECMA of France cooperated to build aircraft engines, yet
Evolving from Strong Ties to Weak Ties
First introduced in Chapter 5, strong ties are more durable, reliable, and trustworthy
relationships cultivated over a long period of time. Strong ties have two advantages: they are
associated with exchanging finer-grained, higher quality information, and although interpersonal
and interfirm relationships may be fraught with potential opportunism, strong ties serve as an
In the same way that individuals tend to have a combination of a small number of good friends
(strong ties) and a large number of acquaintances (weak ties), firms at any given point in time are
likely to have a combination of strong ties and weak ties in their interfirm relationships. In
environments conducive for exploitation, strong ties may be more beneficial. Conversely, in
environments suitable for exploration, weak ties may be preferred.
Amazon’s changing alliance portfolio is indicative of such evolution. Initially, Amazon
established strong ties and based strategic alliances with a few key publishing and distributing
firms. As Amazon expanded to cover new products (videos and electronics) and new business
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From Corporate Marriage to Divorce
Alliances are often described as corporate marriages and, when terminated, as corporate
divorces. To apply the metaphor of divorce, we focus on the two-partner alliance. Following the
convention in research on human divorce, the party who begins the process of ending the
alliance is labeled the initiator, while the other party is termed the partner.
Alliance Dissolution
The first phase is initiation. The process begins when the initiator starts feeling uncomfortable
with the alliance (for whatever reason). The second phase is going public. The party that breaks
the news first has a first-mover advantage. By presenting a socially acceptable reason in favor of
PERFORMANCE
The Performance of Strategic Alliances and Networks
There is no consensus on what constitutes alliance/network performance. A combination of
objective and subjective measures can be used to determine performance, as shown in Table 7.4.
Four factors may influence the performance of alliances and networks: (1) equity, (2) learning
and experience, (3) nationality, and (4) relational capabilities.
Second, whether firms have successfully learned from their partners features prominently when
assessing alliance/network performance. Because organizational learning is abstract and difficult
to measure, experience, which is relatively easy to measure, is often used as a proxy. Impact on
performance is not linear, because a limit exists beyond which further increase in experience
may not necessarily provide additional performance benefits.
Third, nationality may affect performance. For the same reason that marriages between people of
dissimilar backgrounds can be less stable than those with similar backgrounds, dissimilarities in
national culture may create strains in interfirm relationships. Not surprisingly, international
alliances and networks tend to have more problems than domestic relationships. Firms usually
prefer to first ally with culturally close partners; only after acquiring some experience will firms
consider culturally distant partners.
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The Performance of Parent Firms
Do parent firms benefit from engaging in strategic alliances and networks? A number of studies
DEBATES AND EXTENSIONS
Majority JVs as Control Mechanisms versus Minority JVs as Real Options
Similar to the “high control versus low control” debate in Chapter 6, a long-standing debate
focuses on the appropriate level of equity in JVs. While the logic of having a higher level of
equity control in majority JVs is straightforward, its actual implementation is often problematic.
Consequently, some authors advocate a 50/50 share of management control even when the MNE
Alliances versus Acquisitions
Despite the proliferation of strategic alliances, some writers are debating whether they represent
the best forms of firm growth. Virtually no firm has established a combined “mergers,
acquisitions, and alliances” function. In practice, it may be advisable to explicitly consider
alliances vis-à-vis acquisitions within a single decision framework.
Alliances work well when the ratio of soft to hard assets is relatively high (such as a heavy
concentration of tacit knowledge), whereas acquisitions may be preferred when such a ratio is
low. Also, alliances create value primarily by combining complementary resources, whereas
acquisitions derive most value by eliminating redundant resources. Finally, consistent with real
options thinking, alliances are more suitable when conditions are uncertain, and acquisitions are
preferred when conditions are more certain.
Teaching Tip: A good example of how the failure to compare some of these factors may cost
firms dearly is the 50/50 JV between Coke and Procter and Gamble (P&G), which combined the
fruit drinks businesses of Coke (such as Minute Maid) and P&G (such as Sunny Delight) in
2001. The goal was to combine Coke’s global distribution system with P&G’s R&D capabilities
in consumer products, which seemed reasonable. However, the stock market sent a mixed signal,
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for Coke. Finally, there was little uncertainty regarding the popularity of fruit drinks and
investors found it difficult to understand why Coke would share 50 percent of this fast-growing
business with P&G, a laggard in this industry. Not surprisingly, the JV was terminated within six
months. On the other hand, many M&As (such as DaimlerChrysler) probably would have been
better off by pursuing alliances, at least initially (see Chapter 9).
Acquiring Versus Not Acquiring Alliance Partners
As noted earlier, alliance partners with a high degree of network centrality benefit from being
centrally located in a network of players. One debate deals with whether such centrally located
firms should acquire other more peripheral and typically smaller alliance partners in the network.
Firms from emerging economies such as China, Brazil, and India seem to have little patience and
have often been found to indulge on a “buying binge” in acquiring alliance partners overseas.
THE SAVVY STRATEGIST
While, traditionally, firm strategy is about how a single firm strategizes, the recent rise of
alliances and networks has significantly expanded the strategic horizon by highlighting interfirm
strategy.
This “alliance revolution” has introduced a new perspective to the strategy field. Instead of
concentrating on competition only, a new generation of strategists must be savvy at both
competition and cooperation—in other words, “co-opetition.”
Not surprisingly, this chapter sheds more light on the four fundamental questions in strategy. The
answers to Questions 1 (Why firms differ?) and 2 (How firms behave?) boil down to how
different industry-, resource-, and institution-based considerations drive alliance and network
actions. What determines the scope of the firm (Question 3)—or more specifically, the scope of
the alliance in this context—can be found in the strategic goals behind these relationships. Some
relationships may have a wide scope in anticipation of an eventual merger (such as the Renault-
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POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO CRITICAL DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Pick any recent announcement of the formation of an international alliance. Predict its likely
success or failure.
Examples might vary. An example of a recent international alliance could be BRICS. It is the
title of an association of emerging economies and comprises of Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa. With the exception of Russia, the members are all from developing or
2. ON ETHICS: During the courtship and negotiation stages, managers often emphasize “equal
partnerships” and do not reveal (and try to hide) their true intentions. What are the ethical
dilemmas here?
To truly derive benefits from alliances, managers need to foster trust with partners, while at
the same time being on guard against opportunism. The issue of imitability can arise, and one
do in the alliance.
3. ON ETHICS: Some argue that engaging in a “learning race” is unethical. Others believe that
a “learning race” is part and parcel of alliance relationships, especially those with competitors.
What do you think?
Students may say that most firms should expect that their alliance partners will want to learn
from them. This is especially true with firms from developing countries that have quite a lot of
catching up to do in terms of technology and organizational routines. A firm should try to
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TOPICS FOR EXPANDED PROJECTS
1. Some argue that at a 30%–70% failure rate (depending on different studies), strategic
alliances and networks have a strikingly high failure rate and that firms need to scale down
their alliance and network activities. Others suggest that this failure rate is not particularly
higher than the failure rate of new entrepreneurial start-ups, internal corporate ventures, and
new products launched by single companies, and M&As. Therefore, such a failure rate is not
of grave concern. What do you think?
Students’ answers may vary. As with so much in strategy, the situation and other conditions
2. Working in pairs, find the longest-running alliance relationship your research can find.
Present its secrets for such longevity.
Answers might vary. Hewlett-Packard and Disney share one of the longest-running alliances.
It began in the year 1938, when Disney bough eight oscillators to use in the sound design of
its ambitious animated film Fantasia. Disney has relied on HP technology for various
3. What are the similarities and differences between human marriages and interfirm alliances?
How can the lessons behind the success and failure of human marriages enhance the odds of
alliance success?
Answers might vary. As much as alliances represent a strategic and economic arrangement,
they also constitute a social, psychological, and emotional phenomenon: words such as
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access new customers. In the case of a marriage, it would also be acquiring new relatives
and friends, though that is not, of course, the primary purpose of marriage. Similar to the