shoes, leather, and other intermediate inputs are 18 percent, 10 percent, and 5
percent, respectively.
a. Calculate the effective rate of protection for leather shoes.
b. For shoes sold in the protected domestic market, what does this ERP value imply
about payments to labor and capital in shoe production in this country compared to
those payments when production occurs at world prices?
c. The tariff structure above implies tariff escalation. Explain some of the
consequences of such escalation on the effective rate of protection received by
the shoe industry.
6. A country imposes a tariff rate quota (TRQ) on imports of tuna fish. Suppose that for
imports up to 3,000 tons the tariff is $0, and for imports greater than 3,000 tons the
tariff is $175 per ton.
a. If the demand for imports of tuna is Q = 5,000 – 4P, and the supply of imported
tuna is Q = 200 + 8P, what is the price paid by consumers? Compare this solution
to the free trade equilibrium. Be sure to comment on the role of the TRQ.
b. If the demand curve becomes Q = 6,000 – 4P, due to the alleged benefits of tuna
consumption to ensure long life and improved intellectual acuity, what influence
does that have on the price and quantity of imports? Again, comment on the role
of the TRQ. (Hint: if P represents the price paid by consumers, then the foreign
supplier now receives P – $175.)
c. If foreign productivity in tuna fish production rises so that the new foreign supply
curve is
Q = 1,000 + 8P, how does productivity improvement get shared between
producers and consumers, compared to the solution you found in part (b)? Again,
comment on the role of the TRQ.
7. You observe the following information reported by the USITC regarding imports of
butter: the within-quota landed, duty-paid price of butter is $2.798 per kilogram, and
the comparable over-quota price is $3.299. The within-quota tariff is 13.3 cents per
kilogram, and the over-quota tariff is 154.1 cents per kilogram. What do these numbers
suggest about the portion of the tariff equivalent of the quota that is captured by
foreign suppliers?
8. Given your understanding of the different effects of tariffs and quotas, what benefit
would you expect from the World Trade Organization’s success in converting quotas
and other quantitative restrictions into tariffs?
9. Who gains and who loses from the imposition of an export tax? For countries that have
constitutional prohibitions against imposing export taxes, have they lost an effective
trade policy tool? Explain. If a country bans the export of a product, why does that not
make effective use of its market power internationally?
10. Why does a small country lose less from an export subsidy than a large country? Can
a country gain from an export subsidy in a perfectly competitive industry?