Chapter 4 Emphasizing Institutions, Cultures, and Ethics
One important source of transaction costs is opportunism, defined as “self-interest seeking with
guile.” In an effort to reduce these nontrivial transaction costs, institutional frameworks facilitate
certainty-enhancing strategies by spelling out the rules of the game.
Teaching Tip: The case of the oil industry in Argentina and the high transaction costs caused by
a weak institutional framework is instructive. In 1955, the government canceled international
contracts signed by a previous president, Peron, in 1952. The next president signed new contracts
in 1958, which were nullified in 1963 by a different president. Foreign oil companies were
invited to return in 1966, expelled in 1973, and again encouraged to enter after 1976. Not the
best conditions for an industry requiring heavy investment. Ask students to research the details
of this case and comment on it based on what they have learned.
How Do Institutions Reduce Uncertainty?
As noted, the two primary kinds of institutions—informal and formal—reduce uncertainty in
economic transactions. Often called relational contracting, the first kind of economic transaction
is an informal, relationship-based, personalized exchange. In many parts of the world, there is no
need to write an IOU note when you borrow money from your friends. Insisting on such a note,
Often termed arm’s-length transactions, the second institutional mode to govern relationships is a
formal, rule-based, impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement. As the economy expands,
the scale and scope of transactions rise (many entrepreneurs want to borrow more money to start
up firms), calling for the emergence of third-party enforcement through formal market-
supporting institutions. As shown in Figure 4.2, the initial costs per transaction are high, because
of the high costs of formal institutions. Services provided by the court system, police forces, and
law firms are expensive. Small villages usually cannot afford and do not need them. Over time,
however, third-party enforcement is likely to facilitate the widening of markets, because