128 Krugman/Obstfeld/Melitz • International Economics: Theory & Policy, Tenth Edition
◼ Chapter Overview
The international capital market, involving Eurocurrencies, offshore bond and equity trading, and
International Banking Facilities, initially may strike students as one of the more arcane areas covered
in this course. Much of the apparent mystery is dispelled in this chapter. The chapter demonstrates
that issues in this area are directly related to other issues already discussed in the course, including
macroeconomic stability, the role of government intervention, and the gains from trade.
Using the same logic that we applied to show the gains from trade in goods or the gains from intertemporal
trade, we can see how the international exchanges of assets with different risk characteristics can make
both parties to a transaction better off. International portfolio diversification allows people to reduce the
variability of their wealth. When people are risk-averse, this diversification improves welfare. An
important function of the international capital market is to facilitate such welfare-enhancing exchanges of
both debt instruments, such as bonds, and equity instruments, such as stocks.
Offshore banking activity is at the center of the international capital market. Central to offshore banking
are Eurocurrencies (not to be confused with euros), which are bank deposits in one country that are
denominated in terms of another country’s currency. Relatively lax regulation of Eurocurrency deposits
compared with onshore deposits allows banks to pay relatively high returns on Eurocurrency deposits.
This has fostered the rapid growth of offshore banking. Growth has also been spurred, however, by
political factors, such as the reluctance of Arab OPEC members to place surplus funds in American
banks after the first oil shock for fear of confiscation by the U.S. government following the confiscation of
Iranian deposits in 1979.
The text also introduces issues of regulating capital markets. Central to this task is the notion of how banks
fail, and what can be done to prevent bank failures. Bank regulation presents a trade-off between financial
stability and moral hazard. You want to promote confidence in the banking system through financial
support, but too much support encourages risk taking by the banks. Deposit insurance, regulations, and
lenders of last resort can all help prevent the lack of confidence in a banking system that can generate a run
on the banking assets. International banking presents additional challenges as rules are not uniform,
responsibility can be unclear, and enforcement is difficult. This tension is highlighted by the “financial
trilemma,” the observation that you can only ever have two of the following three policy goals: financial
stability, national control over financial safeguard policy (e.g., FDIC insurance), and free capital mobility.
If for example, one country was perceived to be more likely to bail out their national banking system, then
this would trigger a flow of capital to that country as well as increase the risk-taking behavior of that
nation’s banks, reducing financial stability.
Industrialized countries are involved in an effort to coordinate their bank supervision practices to enhance
the stability of the global financial system. Common supervisory standards set by the Basel Committee
were developed. Potential problems remain, however, especially regarding the clarification of the division
of lender-of-last-resort responsibilities among countries and the increasingly large role of nonbank
financial firms, which makes it harder for regulators to oversee global financial flows. The text highlights
these regulatory difficulties using a case study of the subprime mortgage market in the United States. This
case study is also used to illustrate the difficult balance regulators face between creating moral hazard and
maintaining financial stability. The financial crisis of 2007–2009 also highlights the increasingly important
role played by nonbank financial institutions, the so-called “Shadow Banking System.” Though these
institutions operate much like banks and their profits are intertwined with those of commercial banks, they
are not regulated like commercial banks. Much of the riskiest behavior that contributed to the financial
crisis was initiated by these institutions. In response, the U.S. Congress recently passed the Dodd-Frank
Act, which allows the government to regulate these institutions like banks. This represents another
example of the difficulty in balancing financial support (the bailouts of financial institutions) with moral
hazard (increased supervision and regulation).