110 CHAPTER 5 | The Economics of Health Care
Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material.
This problem is about adverse selection, so you may want to review the section “Adverse
Selection in the Market for Health Insurance,” which is on page 227, and “How Insurance
Companies Deal with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,” which is on page 229.
Step 2: Answer part (a) by explaining why a young and healthy person might decide not
to buy health insurance.
When you buy health insurance, you (or your employer on your behalf) make premium
payments to an insurance company. If you are healthy and rarely visit the doctor or buy
Step 3: Answer part (b) by explaining why young people who buy health insurance may
be providing a subsidy for people who are older or who are ill.
The basis of insurance is risk pooling, with insurance companies pooling the risks of a
catastrophic event, such as injuries from a car accident or expensive treatment for disease,
Step 4: Answer part (c) by explaining how the actions of young people might lead to an
adverse selection cascade in the health insurance system.
Brooks is referring to a process sometimes called an adverse selection “death spiral.” If young
and healthy people who pay premiums but make few claims drop out of an insurance system,
Extra Credit: The authors of the ACA law were well aware of the potential for adverse selection
problems in the health insurance system, particularly because the law sharply limits the ability of
insurance companies to deny coverage to people with pre-existing conditions. The law attempted to
reduce adverse selection problems by requiring that everyone have health insurance. Those who refuse
are subject to a fine. There is some question, however, whether the fines will provide enough incentive for
young and healthy people to buy health insurance.