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Chapter 12
Fiscal Policy, Incentives, and Secondary Effects
OUTLINE
I. Fiscal Policy, Borrowing, and the Crowding-Out Effect
A. Crowding-out Effect indicates that the increased borrowing to finance a budget deficit
will increase real interest rates and thereby retard private spending. Thus, fiscal policy
is not very potent.
B. The implications of the crowding-out analysis are symmetrical. Restrictive fiscal
II. Fiscal Policy, Future Taxes, and the New Classical Model
A. The new classical view stresses that debt financing merely substitutes higher future
taxes for lower current taxes. Thus, budget deficits affect the timing of taxes, but not
their magnitude.
B. Argues that when debt is substituted for taxes, people will save the increased income
so they will be able to pay the higher future taxes. Thus, the budget deficit does not
stimulate aggregate demand.
III. Political Incentives and the Effective Use of Discretionary Fiscal Policy
A. Public choice analysis indicates that legislators are delighted to spend money on
programs that directly benefit their own constituents but are reluctant to raise taxes
because they impose a visible cost on voters.
IV. Is Discretionary Fiscal Policy an Effective Stabilization Tool?
A. Proper timing of discretionary fiscal policy is both difficult to achieve and crucially
important.
B. Automatic stabilizers reduce fluctuations in aggregate demand and help keep the
economy on track..
C. Fiscal policy is much less potent than the early Keynesian view implied
V. The Supply-Side Effects of Fiscal Policy
A. From a supply-side viewpoint, the marginal tax rate is of crucial importance. A
reduction in marginal tax rates increases the reward derived from added work,
investment, saving, and other activities that become less-heavily taxed.