U.S.C. §229(a)(1). As we saw in Chapter 2, in United States v. Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply to a “simple assault” using
household chemicals. Is the Chemical Weapons Act equally inapplicable to a disgruntled
patient, a pharmacist, who spread mercury throughout a hospital in retaliation for what he
believed was substandard treatment and excessive billing? If so, what separates the case from
2. In addition to the many federal terrorist-related statutes discussed in this chapter, Congress
also passed a statute directed at threats against federal judges, 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In
United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir.2013), cert denied 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014) a man
upset with a decision on gun control by federal judges put posts on his gun rights blog
criticizing the judges and the decision. It is clear the First Amendment protects such speech,
even if it is virulent and even violent. At what point did the man cross the line and violate
section 115? How would you define that line?
3. Terrorists use social media to advance their goals. The terrorist group al-Shabab, which
attacked a shopping center in Kenya, Nairobi in 2013 killing nearly 70 civilians, used Twitter
accounts to publicize the attacks, showing live films and information about the attacks. The
Islamic State of Iraq is well-known for its use of social media to advance its cause. While
Twitter, Facebook and other social media monitor the use of their sites, they are not always
successful at keeping terrorist-supporting posts from the terrorist accounts. Should Congress
pass a law making social media companies liable if they don’t monitor accounts closely
enough? In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) there is some language
4. There are threats, and there are terrorist threats. Many threats are not crimes, and many
others are misdemeanors. Terrorist threats, however, are generally felonies, and carry
substantial prison sentences as punishment. When a person makes a threat, the prosecution
must decide how to frame the charges. In State v. Yocum, 759 S.E.2d 182 (W.Va. 2014) the
defendant was arrested on a domestic disturbance call. While in the back seat of the officer’s
police cruiser, the defendant said, “After I get out of jail, I’ll be fu*king your wife, and I will
fu*k your daughters.” (The officer had two step-daughters, ages 9 and 12.) He was charged and
convicted under the West Virginia terrorist threat statute, W.Va. Code §61-6-24, which, like
most state terrorist threat statutes, identifies a terrorist threat as a threat of serious injury
intended to intimidate or affect the conduct of a branch of government. On appeal the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Why did it do so? What should
the prosecution have done instead?