10. An argument can be made either way. At one extreme, we could argue that in a market economy, all
of these things are priced. This implies an optimal level of ethical and/or illegal behavior and the
framework of stock valuation explicitly includes these. At the other extreme, we could argue that these
are non-economic phenomena and are best handled through the political process. The following is a
classic (and highly relevant) thought question that illustrates this debate: “A firm has estimated that
the cost of improving the safety of one of its products is $30 million. However, the firm believes that
improving the safety of the product will only save $20 million in product liability claims. What should
the firm do?”
13. We would expect agency problems to be less severe in other countries, primarily due to the relatively
small percentage of individual ownership. Fewer individual owners should reduce the number of
diverse opinions concerning corporate goals. The high percentage of institutional ownership might
lead to a higher degree of agreement between owners and managers on decisions concerning risky
projects. In addition, institutions may be able to implement more effective monitoring mechanisms
than can individual owners, given institutions’ deeper resources and experiences with their own
management. The increase in institutional ownership of stock in the United States and the growing
activism of these large shareholder groups may lead to a reduction in agency problems for U.S.
corporations and a more efficient market for corporate control.