C A S E T E A C H I N G N O T E S
GMB: strategic leadership in a trade union
Phil Wyatt
1. Introduction
This case examines strategic leadership in a not-for-profit organisation. Its main focus is on
2. Position of the case
The case concerns the different ways in which GMB management has tried to manage
turnaround and change from the start of the 1990s to 2012, especially since the financial crisis
3. Learning objectives
The case enables students to:
Grasp how different strategy lenses can assist in an understanding of GMB strategy (Section
1.6 and Commentary)
Identify symptoms of GMB strategic drift and the significance of GMB history and culture
for the intended and emergent strategy (Chapter 5 and Section 12.3)
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4. Teaching scheme
The earlier questions might best be addressed via plenary discussion with the final question
5. Questions for discussion
1. Why did GMB display symptoms of strategic drift while John Edmonds was the leader?
Why did his attempts at a turnaround strategy fail?
6. Case analysis
1. Why did GMB display symptoms of strategic drift while John Edmonds was the leader?
Why did his attempts at a turnaround strategy fail?
The symptoms should have been easy to see: falling membership, persistent operating deficits,
and an inability to replace members lost in manufacturing industry with sufficient new recruits
in the expanding public and private services sectors.
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The 1997 re-organisation reflected hesitancy about tackling the operational deficits on the scale
required. The entrenched GMB tradition of regional autonomy meant that only a halfway house
solution was agreed to the issue of cutting the costs of financial administration. Edmonds
attempt to find further economies by merging regions further alienated regional power bases
among regional secretaries and union activists.
There were a few instances of regional autonomy being exploited to conduct trial experiments
or pilot studies. One was an examination of earnings-related union contribution rates in
Northern region in the early 1990s. A second was a 1998 invitation by the central executive
council to two regions, each to select a target town in which to raise the GMB profile and recruit
actively, as a step towards community unionism. Though all regions were urged in the late
1990s to adopt London Regions workplace health reports approach to consolidating
membership in existing workplaces, Londons real success stemmed from its efforts to replace
members lost in manufacturing with new recruits in the private and public services.
By increasing the number of regional officer posts, which were mostly filled by appointing
leading union activists, Edmonds met the expectations of one group of key stakeholders. His
2. To what extent is GMBs strategy intended/planned or emergent/culturally determined?
The purpose statement adopted by the GMB Congress in 1990 survives today (in simplified
form having been rewritten in plain English) although in 2013, it was dropped from the diary
The planned/intended strategy embodied in the seven top priority targets endorsed by the GMB
central executive council in 1992 was not what emerged in practice during the 1990s.
A balanced budget was only achieved once, in 1993, and never again during John Edmonds
period in office. A so-called balanced budget was reported to the June 1999 GMB Congress,
but the year ended in another deficit.
GMB became path dependent, sticking to familiar customers in workplaces, where it already
had a membership base and making traditional appeals to new employees. It worked hard to
replace the approximately 15 per cent of members GMB lost each year and assumed that leavers
had mostly retired, lost or changed their job, or died. Only once did the union systematically
survey leavers to check whether they were unhappy with the standard of service received from
GMB or whether their reasons for leaving differed in different sectors of the economy.
The balance of power between the general secretary and the ten regional secretaries locked both
sides into a bumpy equilibrium. Regional autonomy allowed regions to disagree with the
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3. What levers for managing change did Paul Kenny use in developing GMB strategy after
2003?
You never want a serious crisis to go to waste said Rahm Emanuel, President Barack Obamas
chief of staff, Wall Street Journal 21 November 2008. i
The 200304 cuts package instigated by the GMBs banks but determined by Kenny and his
allies among the other regional secretaries and central executive council members stabilised the
Since 2003, Paul Kenny has displayed peerless political skills. By taking control of Kevin
Currans attempt to set up a commission into the unions future, and by launching a lawyer-led
inquiry into allegations of breaches of union rules and ballot rigging during the 2003 general
secretary election, Kenny and his supporters among regional secretaries and central executive
council members prepared the ground for Currans suspension in March 2005. By arranging
Currans swift exit from the union within weeks of his own appointment as acting general
secretary, Kenny removed a potential cause célèbre around which his rivals could congregate at
the June 2005 GMB Congress and relieved the tense atmosphere of internal conflict that had
prevailed since the 2003 election result.
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4. How do the design and experience strategy lenses help to make sense of GMB strategy
since 1990?
A chronological approach is best. The limitations of the strategy as design lens are starkly
exposed as the strategy as experience lens proves more productive, both during John Edmonds
tenure and especially since 2003.
Serious weaknesses in GMB workplace organisation that the SWOT analysis had missed such
as a lack of local union activists or accurate membership information were revealed by the
union check-off campaign. This was forced upon it in 1993 by a new law requiring unions to
obtain regular written approval from members for their union contributions to be deducted from
their pay by their employer and paid over to the union. The failure of the 1991 SWOT process
to acknowledge such key vulnerabilities, which came as a shock when they surfaced, suggests
that the exercise had been superficial and called into question whether union management could
face uncomfortable facts.
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John Edmonds won scholarships that led to places at Christs Hospital School, an
independent charitable school dating from 1552, and Oxford University. He became GMB
General Secretary aged 42 after 20 years experience working for the union,18 of them at the
unions head office, including 14 as a national officer, plus only 2 years as a regional
officer. He won a contested election in 1985 and was re-elected unopposed in 1990 and 1995.
Has GMB really turned the corner under Paul Kennys leadership? Or is this just a pause in a
well established downward trend?
Some students may feel that Paul Kenny has achieved stage one of a successful turnaround
GMB members comprised 3.3 per cent of UK employment in 1986 and about 3.0 per cent in
1990. That figure fell to 2.0 percent by 2005, recovering only to 2.1 per cent in 2012.
Between the bottom of recession in 1993 and the peak of the next boom in 2008, UK
employment rose by more than four million. But membership of unions in the Trades Union
Congress (TUC) fell by 800,000. Economic recovery is no guarantee that union
membership will also recover.
Yet despite this, since 1990 GMB management, officers and activists have preferred to recruit
at workplaces, where the union already has members and is recognised by the employer. Since
2005 GMB has explicitly turned away from green field sites. Is GMBs neglect of employers
in new workplaces an example of tunnel vision? Is GMBs reluctance to entertain partnership
deals with employers and show how much employers can gain from a union presence short
sighted?
Paul Kenny prefers a robust relationship with employers. Two examples show, how he is
sometimes prepared to step outside the GMB conservative culture. He sees no problem in
acknowledging deals from which employers gain, and shows no fear of publicly defending an
unpopular employer with whom he has such a robust relationship.
In June 2012, GMB and the Asda supermarket chain signed a two year agreement covering
10,000 GMB members working in 20 Asda distribution centres. Paul Kenny commented:
Without radical change, has GMB got much of a future? John Edmonds tried to shake things up
in the 1990s but sank into the sands of a conservative GMB culture. Paul Kenny looks unlikely
to be the leader to encourage the kind of culture change that would be needed. His vision for the
future of the union is closer to a culture of contentment.
Further references