194 CASE PRINTOUTS TO ACCOMPANY BUSINESS LAW
and the fervor with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. Perhaps the critical historical event shedding light
on its origins and evolution was the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber
Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. The Trial of John Lilburn
and John Wharton, 3 How.St.Tr. 1315 (1637). He resisted the oath and declaimed the proceedings, stating:
framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that
‘illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing * * * by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure.’ . The privilege was elevated to constitutional status and has always been ‘as broad ad the mischief against which it
seeks to guard.’ . We cannot depart from this noble heritage.
See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 9—11 (1949); 8 Wigmore, Evidence 285—295
Wigmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961), to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. . In sum, the privilege is
fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will.’ .
voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the fifth amendment * * * commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
In Bram, the Court reviewed the British and American history and case law and set down the Fifth Amendment standard for
compulsion which we implement today:
‘Much of the confusion which has resulted from the effort to deduce from the adjudged cases what would be a sufficient quantum
a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. A confession may have
been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by
them. But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion,
and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise. ‘ .
In addition to the expansive historical development of the privilege and the sound policies which have nurtured its evolution,
(1958).
Our decision in , necessitates an examination of the scope of the privilege in state cases as well. In Malloy, we squarely held the
privilege applicable to the States, and held that the substantive standards underlying the privilege applied with full force to state
court proceedings. There, as in , and , we applied the existing Fifth Amendment standards to the case before us. Aside from the
holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy made clear what had already become apparent—that the substantive and procedural
confession offered at trial, 12 L.Ed.2d 904 (1964); ; see also . Appellate review is exacting, see ; . Whether his
conviction was in a federal or state court, the defendant may secure a post-conviction hearing based on the alleged
involuntary character of his confession, provided he meets the procedural requirements, ; . In addition, see .
See ; ; ; ; ; .
Our holding there stressed the fact that the police had not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege to remain silent at
denied his request for the assistance of counsel, This heightened his dilemma, and made his later statements the product of this
compulsion. Cf. . The denial of the defendant’s request for his attorney thus undermined his ability to exercise the privilege—to
remain silent if he chose or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us
today, would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of
the privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already
been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.’ (Harlan, J., dissenting). Cf. .
(Black, J., dissenting); Note, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1048—1051 (1964); Comment, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 313, 320 (1964) and
authorities cited.
III.
decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
general belief that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for you if
you do not.’ Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 32 (1958).
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. ; ; Comment, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 556 (1964); Developments in
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against
the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences
of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and
intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced
with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to
talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the
likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in
court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that
had fortuitously prompted him to make it.’ (Tobriner, J.).
In , we stated: ‘(I)t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel
does not depend on a request.’ This proposition applies with equal force in the context of providing counsel to protect an
accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of interrogation. Although the role of counsel at trial differs from the role during
interrogation, the differences are not relevant to the question whether a request is a prerequisite.
Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the
affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of
little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past
involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the
obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of
nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations of the accused’s liability or penalty. While government may not be
required to relieve the accused of his proverty, it may properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its
administration of justice.’
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only
that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates
on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an
conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they
may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that
time.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
See also . Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if
the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when
interrogated.
Although this Court held in , over strong dissent, that a witness before a grand jury may not in certain circumstanes decide
to answer some questions and then refuse to answer others, that decision has no application to the interrogation situation
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between
statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense. The privilege
against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish
degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements
other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at
this point.
200 CASE PRINTOUTS TO ACCOMPANY BUSINESS LAW
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See When an individual is
in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such
remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of
course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is
allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no
requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who
calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
In accordance with our holdings today and in and are not to be followed.
IV.
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society’s need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument is not
unfamiliar to this Court. See, e.g., . The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed
In quoting the above from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis we, of course, do not intend to pass on the
constitutional questions involved in the Olmstead case.
In this connection, one of our country’s distinguished jurists has pointed out: ‘The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.’
Schaefer, .
The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law
enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory
functions. Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases before us present graphic examples of
the overstatement of the ‘need’ for confessions. In each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five days in
duration despite the presence, through standard investigating practices, of considerable evidence against each defendant. Further
circumstances a lawyer would advise his client to talk freely to police in order to clear himself.
Custodial interrogation, by contrast, does not necessarily afford the innocent an opportunity to clear themselves. A serious
consequence of the present practice of the interrogation alleged to be beneficial for the innocent is that many arrests ‘for
investigation’ subject large numbers of innocent persons to detention and interrogation. In one of the cases before us, No. 584,
California v. Stewart, police held four persons, who were in the defendant’s house at the time of the arrest, in jail for five days until
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising
any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may
be used against him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice and, more recently, that
he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to pay. A letter received from the Solicitor General in response to a question from the
Bench makes it clear that the present pattern of warnings and respect for the rights of the individual followed as a practice by the
is not required to make a statement and that any statement given can be used against him in court. Moreover, the
individual must be informed that, if he desires, he may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice.’ Hoover, Civil
Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 Iowa L.Rev. 175, 177—182 (1952).
‘At the oral argument of the above cause, Mr. Justice Fortas asked whether I could provide certain information as to the
practices followed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I have directed these questions to the attention of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and am submitting herewith a statement of the questions and of the answers which we have
received.
“(1) When an individual is interviewed by agents of the Bureau, what warning is given to him?
“(2) When is the warning given?
“(3) What is the Bureau’s practice in the event that (a) the individual requests counsel and (b) counsel appears?
1965). When counsel appears in person, he is permitted to confer with his client in private.
“(4) What is the Bureau’s practice if the individual requests counsel, but cannot afford to retain an attorney?
(1964) Crim.L.Rev., at 166—170. These Rules provide in part:
‘II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has
committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions, or
further questions, relating to that offence.
‘The caution shall be in the following terms:
(1964) Crim.L.Rev., at 182; and articles collected in (1960) Crim.L.Rev., at 298—356.
The introduction to the Judges’ Rules states in part:
These Rules do not affect the principles
‘(c) That every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a
solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to
Act s 25.
‘No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer unless it be made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.’ Indian Evidence Act s 26. See 1 Ramaswami &
Rajagopalan, Law of Evidence in India 553—569 (1962). To avoid any continuing effect of police pressure or inducement,
the Indian Supreme Court has invalidated a confession made shortly after police brought a suspect before a magistrate,
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it. In any event, however,
the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts. The admissibility of a statement in
the face of a claim that it was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is an issue the resolution of which has
long since been undertaken by this Court. See . Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by
No. 759. Miranda v. Arizona.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He
was there identified by the complaining witness. The police then took him to ‘Interrogation Room No. 2′ of the detective bureau.
There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to
have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by
No. 760. Vignera v. New York.
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on October 14, 1960, in connection with the robbery three days
earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he
was taken to the 66th Detective Squad. There a detective questioned Vignera with respect to the robbery. Vignera orally admitted
the robbery to the detective. The detective was asked on cross-examination at trial by defense counsel whether Vignera was
warned of his right to counsel before being interrogated. The prosecution objected to the question and the trial judge sustained the
objection. Thus, the defense was precluded from making any showing that warnings had not been given. While at the 66th
Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3
p.m. he was formally arrested. The police then transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, ‘for detention.’
At 11 p.m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the
questions and Vignera’s answers. This verbatim account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the
assistant district attorney. At Vignera’s trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the oral confession.
The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge
charged the jury in part as follows:
‘The law doesn’t say that the confession is void or invalidated because the police officer didn’t advise the defendant as to his
rights. Did you hear what I said? I am telling you what the law of the State of New York is.’
No. 761. Westover v. United States.
At approximately 9:45 p.m. on March 20, 1963, petitioner, Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A report was also received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in
California. The local authorities took him to a police station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45
p.m. he was booked. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He denied any knowledge of criminal
206 CASE PRINTOUTS TO ACCOMPANY BUSINESS LAW
was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. .
We reverse. On the facts of this case we cannot find that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and
his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover,
emphasized by the Solicitor General, does not preclude our consideration of the issue. Since the trial was held prior to our
decision in Escobedo and, of course, prior to our decision today making the objection available, the failure to object at trial
does not constitute a waiver of the claim. See, e.g., , aff’d, . Cf. .
We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period
of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an
No. 584. California v. Stewart.
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her
assailant, respondent, Roy Allen Stewart, was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken in one
of the robberies. At about 7:15 p.m., January 31, 1963, police officers went to Stewart’s house and arrested him. One of the
officers asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which he replied, ‘Go ahead.’ The search turned up various items taken
interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was ever advised of his rights.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the
confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder
and fixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of It held that under this Court’s decision in Escobedo, Stewart
should have been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel and that it would not presume in the face of a
to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
After certiorari was granted in this case, respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no final judgment
from which the State could appeal since the judgment below directed that he be retried. In the event respondent was
successful in obtaining an acquittal on retrial, however, under California law the State would have no appeal. Satisfied
that in these circumstances the decision below constituted a final judgment under ed.), we denied the motion. .
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of
Appeals in No. 760, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761 are reversed. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of California in No. 584 is affirmed. It is so ordered.
Judgments of Supreme Court of Arizona in No. 759, of New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in No. 761 reversed.
Judgment of Supreme Court of California in No. 584 affirmed.
Supplemental Case Printout for:
Shifting Legal Priorities for
Business
U.S.Ky.,1987.
McNally v. U.S.
483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292, 55 USLW 5011, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6663
Supreme Court of the United States
Charles J. McNALLY, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.
FN1. Section 1341 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, … for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
the recipients of these payments was Seton Investments, Inc. (Seton), a company controlled by Hunt and petitioner Gray and
nominally owned and operated by petitioner McNally.
Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation from 1976 to 1978 and also as Secretary of the Governor’s Cabinet
from 1977 to 1979. Prior to his 1976 appointment, he and Hunt established Seton for the sole purpose of sharing in the
commissions distributed by Wombwell. Wombwell paid some $200,000 to Seton between 1975 and 1979, and the money was
FN2. The six counts dismissed were based on the mailing of Seton’s tax returns. The Court of Appeals held that mailings
required by law cannot be made the basis for liability under § 1341 unless the documents are themselves false, see
Parr
FN3. The mail fraud count also alleged that petitioners’ fraudulent scheme had the purpose of defrauding the citizens and
government of Kentucky of their right to be made aware of all relevant facts when selecting an insurance agent to write
the Commonwealth’s workmen’s compensation insurance policy. The District Court did not instruct on this purpose,
holding that it was subsumed in the purpose to deny the right to honest government.
FN4. The instruction summarized the charges as follows:
“Count 4 of the Indictment charges in part that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to:
“(a)(1) defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its governmental departments, agencies, officials
and employees of their right to have the Commonwealth’s business and its affairs conducted honestly, impartially, free
from corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct, and fraud; and,
The Government concedes that it was error for the District Court to include the instruction on tax fraud in the
substantive mail fraud instruction, see
id.,
at 11, n. 9, but the effect of that error is not now at issue.
The jury convicted petitioners on both the mail fraud and conspiracy counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 790
F.2d 1290 (CA6 1986). In affirming the substantive mail fraud conviction, the court relied on a line of decisions from the Courts of
Appeals holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial
As first enacted in 1872, as part of a recodification of the postal laws, the statute contained a general proscription against using the
mails to initiate correspondence in furtherance of “any scheme or artifice to defraud.” The sponsor of the recodification stated, in
apparent reference to the antifraud provision, that measures were needed “to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the
large cities … by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the
country.” FN5 Insofar as the sparse legislative history reveals anything, it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud
FN5. Cong.Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). These remarks were made during the
debate on H.R. 2295, the recodification legislation introduced during the 41st Congress. Representative Farnsworth
proceeded to describe a scheme whereby the mail was used to solicit the purchase by greedy and unwary persons of
counterfeit bills, which were never delivered.
The recodification bill was not passed by the 41st Congress, but was reintroduced and passed by the 42d Congress
511. However, instead of the phrase “everything designed to defraud” Congress used the words “[any scheme or artifice] for
obtaining money or property.”
FN6. Prior to
Durland
Congress had amended the statute to add language expressly reaching schemes of the period,
many of the same nature as those mentioned by Representative Farnsworth in 1870, see n. 5,
supra,
dealing or
pretending to deal in counterfeit currency under such names as “green coin” or “green cigars.” Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch.
FN7. The new language was suggested in the Report of the Commission to Revise and Codify the Criminal and Penal
Laws of the United States, which cited
Durland
in the margin of its Report. See S.Doc. No. 68, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, 63, 64 (1901). The sponsor of the 1909 legislation did not address the significance of the new language, stating that it
was self-explanatory. 42 Cong.Rec. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn).
FN8.
Hammerschmidt
concerned the scope of the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes criminal any conspiracy
“to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.”
Hammerschmidt
indicates, in
regard to that statute, that while “[t]o conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the Government out
of property or money, … it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft
or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.” 265 U.S., at 188, 44 S.Ct., at 512. Other cases have held that § 371
(1971). As the Court said in a mail fraud case years ago: “There are no constructive offenses; and before one can be punished, it
must be shown that his case is plainly within the statute.”
Fasulo v. United States,
272 U.S. 620, 629, 47 S.Ct. 200, 202, 71 L.Ed.
443 (1926). Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in
FN9. Justice STEVENS would affirm the convictions even though it was not charged that requiring the Wombwell agency
to share commissions violated state law. We should assume that it did not. For the same reason we should assume that it
was not illegal under state law for Hunt and Gray to own one of the agencies sharing in the commissions and hence to
profit from the arrangement, whether or not they disclosed it to others in the state government. It is worth observing as
well that it was not alleged that the mail fraud statute would have been violated had Hunt and Gray reported to state
