B-216
ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 50
REAL PROPERTY AND LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIPS
50-1A. Easements
(Chapter 50—Pages 980–981)
and (5) with the knowledge of such owner at a time when he was able in law to assert and enforce his
rights.” The court added, “A party can establish a prescriptive right even though the owner of the servi-
ent estate and others who wanted to go on the property also used it, so long as the claimant exercises
50-2A. Taking
(Chapter 50—Pages 988–990)
The court agreed with the Nollans, and the CCC appealed. The appellate court ruled in the CCC’s favor,
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 50 B-217
50-3A. Easements
(Chapter 50—Pages 980–981)
50-4A. Breach of the lease contract
(Chapter 50—Pages 995–996)
A lease may be terminated by express agreement or by implied agreement. The latter is sometimes
50-5A. Maintaining the premises
(Chapter 50—Page 993)
The trial court ruled in favor of SDR, and ARG appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision. ARG was ordered to pay $200,000 in damages to SDR. ARG’s main argument on appeal con-
50-6A. Lease renewal
(Chapter 50—Pages 995–996)
The court held that MCM’s right to exercise the lease renewal option terminated when the lease term
expired. As a general rule, a lessee must exercise an option to renew the lease on or before the expira-
days’ notice.
50-7A. Commercial lease terms
(Chapter 50—Page 993)
The court accepted the defendants’ arguments and granted an injunction on that basis. Winn-Dixie ap-
pealed to a state intermediate appellate court, which reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded
the case for a revision of the injunction. The appellate court explained that “[g]roceries are generally de-
fined as ‘articles of food and other goods sold by a grocer,’ and a grocer is defined as ‘a dealer in staple
food stuffs . . . and many household supplies (as soap, matches, paper napkins).’ ” Winn–Dixie “negoti-
50-8A. Concurrent ownership
(Chapter 50—Pages 978–979)
The court held that the three accounts were held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, based on
the terms that the bank had placed on each account. The court acknowledged that if there had been ev-
14.
50-9A. Concurrent ownership
(Chapter 50—Pages 978–979)
The county denied Hennefield and O’Dell’s claim, and they appealed to a state trial court, which held
that their attempted “re–conveyance” was not effective. The court explained that, among other things, a
50-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. The trial court held that the Urbans had acquired title to the disputed property by adverse
possession. On appeal, however, this ruling was reversed. The appellate court agreed with the Stanards
2. If it does not, it should. One of the requirements for adverse possession is the continuous
possession of the property. Continuity is broken if the adverse possessor acknowledges the owner’s ti-
tle. Even if the shed had not been erected, Urban’s offer to purchase the property—which acknowl-
edged that the Stanards owned the property—sometime between 1980 and 1982 would have broken
the fifteen-year period, which began in 1969 and therefore would not end until 1984.
3. Generally, trespasses on another’s property must be substantial to establish adverse posses-
sion. Furthermore, the trespasser is normally required to show by some act that his or her entry upon
B-220 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 50
4. A basic public policy reflected in adverse possession statutes is that land should be used and