B-202
ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 47
ANTITRUST LAW
47-1A. Antitrust laws
(Chapter 47—Pages 920–921)
The independents alleged violations of the Sherman Act (and various state laws). They contended that
47-2A. Tying arrangements
(Chapter 47—Page 925)
The United States Supreme Court held that Kodak may have illegally tied its brand of equipment repair
parts to the purchase of its repair services. The Court rejected Kodak’s arguments that competition in
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 47 B-203
thing that he would not do in a competitive market.’ * * * The existence of such power ordinarily is in-
ferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the market.” Thus, Kodak’s argument was
47-3A. Robinson-Patman Act
(Chapter 47—Page 924)
The federal district court issued a judgment in Stelwagon’s favor, and Tarmac appealed. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in part that Stelwagon established a prima facie violation of price
47-4A. Restraint of trade
(Chapter 47—Pages 914–916)
The court granted a summary judgment in favor of the coaches and issued a permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the rule. On the NCAA’s appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
B-204 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 47
competitive effects” of the rule, however, (the NCAA argued that the rule allowed for new coaches to
47-5A. Tying arrangement
(Chapter 47—Page 925)
The court found that PIC had breached its contract with MCA and had infringed MCA’s copyrights, and
awarded MCA damages. As for PIC’s antitrust claim, the court found that the contract for “Harry” was
an illegal tying arrangement, a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and not enforceable. The court con-
cluded, however, that PIC was not entitled to damages. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s rulings on MCA’s claims
but vacated the award of damages and remanded for a new determination of the amount. As for the
antitrust claim, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that the “Harry” agreement
was per se illegal under the Sherman Act but also remanded for a redetermination of damages. The ap-
47-6A. Attempted monopolization
(Chapter 47—Pages 922–923)
The court granted a summary judgment in favor of Intel. First, the court pointed out that MVL and Intel
did not compete in the market for USB interconnect devices. Second, there was “no evidence that Intel’s
47-7A. Monopolization
(Chapter 47—Pages 920–921)
The court ruled that “USTC’s pervasive practice of destroying Conwood’s racks and POS materials . . .
through exclusive agreements with and misrepresentations to retailers was exclusionary conduct with-
out a sufficient justification, and that USTC maintained its monopoly power by engaging in such con-
duct.” The court awarded Conwood damages of $350 million, which were trebled to $1.05 billion, and an
injunction against USTC for unlawfully monopolizing the market. USTC appealed to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The appellate court noted that absent
USTC’s unlawful conduct, Conwood would have achieved a market share in the mid-20s, that the drop in
47-8A. Restraint of trade
(Chapter 47—Pages 916–917)
The court concluded that Visa and MasterCard’s exclusionary rules were anticompetitive, in violation of
the Sherman Act, because they restricted the ability of Amex and Discover to compete in marketing their
47-9A. Sherman Act
(Chapter 47—Pages 922–923)
B-206 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 47
in the relevant market and (2) willfully acquired or maintained this power. In this case, the court rea-
soned that the relevant market included the market for the sale of teeth to dealers and to laboratories,
47-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. Assuming that the lawyers had attempted and exhausted all alternative means of convincing
the District of Columbia to increase their compensation, the attorneys had only three options: (1) they
could do nothing and continue working for the same compensation, (2) they could discontinue working
2. You may or may not agree that the lawyers’ boycott should be an expression protected under
the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that it should not be con-
sidered protected speech. The Court ruled that the restraint of trade was not protected by the First
Amendment because, “no matter how altruistic the motives” of the attorneys may have been, their
“undenied objective . . . was an economic advantage for those who agreed to participate” in the boy-
cott.
3. One could argue that the SCTLA’s boycott was in effect a “strike” against the District of Colum-
bia conducted for the purpose of increasing compensation. The fact that strikes by unions are legal and
group boycotts by trade associations are illegal is significant legally and politically, but perhaps not so