ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 43
LAW FOR SMALL BUSINESS
43-1A. Intellectual property
(Chapter 43—Pages 843–844)
The court held that Toyota did not violate Section 368–d of New York’s General Business Law. The court
defined the term “dilution”—in the phrase within Section 368-d that reads, “dilution of the distinctive
43-2A. Corporate formalities
(Chapter 43—Page 850)
43-3A. Shareholder agreements
(Chapter 43—Page 848)
43-4A. Hiring and firing
(Chapter 43—Pages 850–851)
43-5A. Owner liability
(Chapter 43—Page 849)
43-6A. Owner liability
(Chapter 43—Page 849)
The state intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment for The Boston
43-7A. Hiring and firing
(Chapter 43—Pages 850–851)
The court should issue a judgment in favor of Anstett and the other employee-plaintiffs and against Ea-
B-188 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 43
43-8A. Trade secrets
(Chapter 43—Page 845)
The court denied the request for a temporary injunction, concluding that “[t]he balance of the equities
does not favor JKH such that justice requires the Court to intervene with temporary injunctive relief.”
The court explained that whether this injunction should be issued “depends upon an evaluation of the
following factors. (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between
this harm and the injury that granting the injunctive relief will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the
probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” The court found no
irreparable harm, noting in part that Dye’s letters only reminded her former clients that their contractu-
al relationship was with JKH, not with her. “To the extent some of JKH’s clients have asked Dye to rec-
ommend another company, the number appears to be very small.” On the issue of the validity of the
43-9A. Trademarks
(Chapter 43—Pages 843–844)
The court held that there was no likelihood of confusion between the trademarks. The court acknowl-
edged that the Teton Glacier mark had “significant inherent strengths,” but found that it had little
43-10A. Employee compensation
(Chapter 43—Page 850)
The court recognized that an auto dealership is a “retail or service establishment,” but reasoned that a
finance and insurance manager is not engaged in the dealership’s “retail” activity, and thus concluded