ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 4
BUSINESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
4-1A. Commerce clause
The court did not agree with Inland-Rome that the contract related to interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply and the arbitration clause was not
4-2A. Freedom of speech
The court dismissed Holland’s complaint, and he appealed. The state intermediate appellate
court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The state intermediate appellate court initially
4-3A. Equal protection
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs appealed. The U.S. Court of
B-2 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4
that gender-based distinctions are acceptable in circumstances in which the two genders are not
similarly situated. The court concluded that “New York City’s objectives of preventing crime,
maintaining property values, and preserving the quality of urban life, are important. We also
believe that the [ordinance’s] regulation of female, but not male, topless dancing, in the context
of its overall regulation of sexually explicit commercial establishments, is substantially related to
4-4A. Freedom of speech
The court held that the state constitutional provision establishing English as the official language
for state employees was invalid because it was overbroad and gave rise to substantial potential
for inhibiting constitutionally protected free speech rights. The court stated that “Article XXVIII,
by its literal wording, is capable of reaching expression protected by the First Amendment, such
as Gutierrez’s [a co–plaintiff’s] right to communicate in Spanish with his Spanish-speaking
constituents.” To determine whether the Article XXVIII reached a substantial amount of
4-5A. Equal protection
The court agreed with Izquierdo. Mercado appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, which reversed this decision. Under the rational-basis test, the question was whether
there was any rational basis under which Mercado’s actions related to a legitimate state interest.
Mercado’s ostensible objective was to replace Ms. Izquierdo with someone with greater audi–
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4 B-3
4-6A. Freedom of speech
Yes. The court denied the board’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
library did not have to provide Internet access, but that if it did, it could not restrict its patrons’
access to sites on the Internet because the library “disfavors their content.” According to the
court, under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the library could impose content–
4-7A. Due process
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “it would be fundamentally unfair to
hold Ashland accountable on probation for actions beyond its control. Ashland maintains that it
would violate its due process rights to punish it for probation violations based solely on the
future acts or omissions of MAP, which is a separate company not under Ashland’s control. We
agree.” The court reasoned that “a defendant may not be sentenced for the crimes of another
. . . . We believe that the probation conditions challenged here similarly improperly conditioned
4-8A. Due process
The court agreed with the Yurczyks’ reasoning, as regarded their substantive due process
rights, that the on-site construction requirement did “not have a substantial bearing upon the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community” and “was not based upon a
legitimate governmental objective.” The county appealed this ruling to the Montana Supreme
B-4 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4
4–9A. The commerce clause
Under the commerce clause, the national government has the power to regulate every
commercial enterprise in the United States. The commerce clause may not justify national
regulation of noneconomic conduct. Interstate travel involves the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, however, and is properly subject to congressional regulation under the
4-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. According to the United States Supreme Court in this case, in the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (FCLAA), “Congress pre-empted state cigarette
advertising regulations like [Massachusetts’] because they would upset federal legislative
choices to require specific warnings and to impose the ban on cigarette advertising in electronic
media in order to address concerns about smoking and health. In holding that the FCLAA does
not nullify the Massachusetts regulations, the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] First Circuit
tertwined with the smoking and health concern.”
2. Regarding a state’s or a locality’s ability to enact generally applicable zoning
restrictions, the Supreme Court recognized that “state interests in traffic safety and esthetics
may justify zoning regulations for advertising. Although [in the FCLAA] Congress has taken into
account the unique concerns about cigarette smoking and health in advertising, there is no
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4 B-5