ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 4
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE BUSINESS
4-1A. Commercial speech
(Chapter 4—Pages 81–82)
The Supreme Court of Illinois had held that Rule 2-105(a) did not violate Peel’s constitutional right to
free speech because the rule served a valid state interest—to protect the public from misleading
advertising. The rule was also not overly broad in its restrictions. It did not prohibit attorneys or firms
from designating areas in which their practices were concentrated or to which their practices were
limited; it only prohibited claims that might deceive or confuse the general public. The Illinois court had
concluded that in the case of Peel’s letter, the public could be misled for all of the reasons cited by the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission and affirmed Peel’s censure. On appeal to the United
4-2A. Commerce clause
(Chapter 4—Pages 75–76)
B-12 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4
4-3A. Freedom of speech
(Chapter 4—Pages 79–80)
The court dismissed Holland’s complaint, and he appealed. The state intermediate appellate court
4-4A. Equal protection
(Chapter 4—Pages 87–88)
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. The plaintiffs argued that because the
ordinance applied to female topless entertainment, but not to male topless entertainment, it violated
4-5A. Freedom of speech
(Chapter 4—Pages 79–80)
The court held that the state constitutional provision establishing English as the official language for
state employees was invalid because it was overbroad and gave rise to substantial potential for
4-6A. Equal protection
(Chapter 4—Pages 87–88)
The court agreed with Izquierdo. Mercado appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
4-7A. Freedom of speech
(Chapter 4—Pages 82–83)
Yes. The court denied the board’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the library did
4-8A. Due process
(Chapter 4—Page 87)
B-14 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “it would be fundamentally unfair to hold
Ashland accountable on probation for actions beyond its control. Ashland maintains that it would violate
its due process rights to punish it for probation violations based solely on the future acts or omissions of
4-9A. Due process
(Chapter 4—Page 87)
The court agreed with the Yurczyks’ reasoning, as regarded their substantive due process rights, that the
on-site construction requirement did “not have a substantial bearing upon the public health, safety,
4-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. According to the United States Supreme Court in this case, in the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (FCLAA), “Congress pre-empted state cigarette advertising
regulations like [Massachusetts’] because they would upset federal legislative choices to require specific
warnings and to impose the ban on cigarette advertising in electronic media in order to address
2. Regarding a state’s or a locality’s ability to enact generally applicable zoning restrictions,
the Supreme Court recognized that “state interests in traffic safety and esthetics may justify zoning
regulations for advertising. Although [in the FCLAA] Congress has taken into account the unique con-
cerns about cigarette smoking and health in advertising, there is no indication that Congress intended to