39-9A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS: Improper incorporation
(a) The sign indicated—at least to Weimar—that an impartial trial could not be had. A judge
or a juror asked to make a finding or render a conclusion in this dispute might perceive the sign as an
endorsement of Lyons or his corporation—or so Weimar likely contended. Because the sign was on the
courthouse lawn, so Weimar’s argument might have run, it could be interpreted as implying that the
court favored Lyons. The court denied the motion for a change of venue, apparently because it did not
accept Weimar’s assertion of certain partiality in the existence of the sign.
(b) The court applied the doctrine of corporation by estoppel and denied Weimar’s motion to
dismiss the counterclaim. Weimar argued that the doctrine’s application in this case “makes no sense
because a dissolved corporation does not exist and could not receive payment on any judgment
awarded in its favor.” The court ultimately ruled in the defendants’ favor. Weimar appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court’s ruling. The state supreme court explained that
under the doctrine of corporation by estoppel if “a business held itself out as a corporation, and . . . a
third party dealing with it assumed it to be a corporation, both the corporation and the third party are
estopped from raising the issue as to whether or not the corporation is validly incorporated. In short, the
fact that an entity is not a corporation should not, in and of itself, be a defense to an otherwise valid
obligation.” The court noted that these principles cover an entity “whose certificate has been revoked by
the state.” The doctrine of corporation by estoppel “prevents a party from denying a party-corporation’s
status. The doctrine may apply to the corporation itself, or to the corporation’s opponent.”
(c) The court concluded, and on appeal the Montana Supreme Court upheld, that the parties’
written contract was a “fixed price” transaction, but that the oral agreements were on a time-and-
materials basis. The court found that the written contract was for identified work at a price of $19,810,
followed by “a series of binding oral agreements” for additional work. Lyons had completed the work he
had agreed to, but some of the work had not been done in a workmanlike manner.