B-147
ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 35
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
35-1A. Discrimination based on race
(Chapter 35—Pages 682–683)
35-2A. Defenses to employment discrimination
(Chapter 35—Page 696)
The court refused to grant O’Driscoll relief, because “Hercules successfully demonstrated that it did not
know of Plaintiff’s misconduct when she was terminated, it would have been justified in terminating
35-3A. Disparate-impact discrimination
(Chapter 35—Page 682)
B-148 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35
To establish disparate-impact discrimination, a plaintiff must first identify the challenged employment
practice. Second, the plaintiff must show a disparate impact on a group characteristic, such as race, that
falls under Title VII. Third, the plaintiff must show that the practice caused the disparate impact. To
35-4A. Discrimination based on disability
(Chapter 35—Pages 691–692)
To establish a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must prove that he or she (1)
has a disability, (2) is “otherwise qualified” for the job, and (3) was excluded from the job due to
35-5A. Religious discrimination
(Chapter 35—Page 683)
The court found in favor of Tiano, holding, among other things, that she established a prima facie case of
religious discrimination. The court awarded Tiano lost wages for the time she was unemployed.
35-6A. Discrimination based on disability
(Chapter 35—Pages 691–692)
The court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed this judgment. Murphy appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed
the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court applied its holding in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 219, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), to conclude that Murphy was not disabled under the
ADA. The Court also concluded that Murphy was not “regarded as” disabled because of his high blood
pressure. The Court explained that this would have been the case if UPS mistakenly believed that his
“actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities,” but UPS did not.
The employer regarded Murphy as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic only because he could not be
certified under the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation. Did Murphy’s inability to obtain
DOT certification cause him to be regarded as “substantially limited” in “the major life activity of
working”? No, reasoned the Court, because under Equal Opportunity Employment Commission regula-
35-7A. Discrimination based on disability
(Chapter 35—Pages 693–694)
The court ordered PGA to permit Martin to use a cart. PGA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the order of the lower court. PGA appealed to the United States Supreme
35-8A. Discrimination based on race
B-150 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35
and remanding for the entry of a judgment in the defendants’ favor. The elements of a prima facie case
are: a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is a member of a protected group; (2) that he or she was
qualified and applied for a position or a promotion for which an employer was seeking applicants; (3)
35-9A. Discrimination based on age
(Chapter 35—Pages 688–689)
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agreed with the employees, and invited General
Dynamics and United Auto Workers (UAW) to settle informally with Cline and the other employees.
1. The trial jury decided in favor of Biggins, and the appellate court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision. In considering the appeal, the court held that “[t]here
is no doubt that plaintiff here made out a prima facie case of age discrimination. He was within the
protected age group. He was sixty– two years old at the time of his termination. He was performing his
2. In the Biggins case, the court noted that by the mid-1980s, the coating that Biggins had
developed while in Hazen’s employ was being “widely used” by Hazen Paper. In 1983, Biggins became
aware of the increase in Hazen’s sales and of the fact that the commissions of one of Hazen’s sales
representatives had increased to over $200,000. Biggins “felt that these sales commission were being
3. Most persons would agree that terminating an employee solely because of his or her age is
unfair. Nevertheless, an employer may find it tempting, when economic times are difficult and the
company is searching for ways to trim its payroll, to engage in what may appear to be age
B-152 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 35
that the discharge was motivated by age bias. Proof that qualified, older employees are generally