878 INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY BUSINESS LAW, TWELFTH EDITION
filed a suit in a federal district court against the PSP. The court issued a summary judgment in the PSP’s favor. Suders appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed and remanded, holding that the Ellerth/Faragher defense is not
available in constructive discharge cases. The PSP appealed. In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded. To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment must show that the
Under the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense would
have been eliminated in all hostile-environment constructive discharge cases, but retained in other hostile-environment cases
(not involving tangible employment actions). How would the courts’ consideration of these cases then differ from
determinations accorded under the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Pennsylvania case? As the Court explained, “[t]hat placement
of the line, anomalously, would make the graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge easier to prove than its
lesser included component, hostile work environment. Moreover, the Third Circuit’s formulation, that court itself recognized,
would make matters complex, indeed, more than a little confusing to jurors. Creation of a hostile work environment is a
necessary predicate to a hostile-environment constructive discharge case. Juries would be so informed. Under the Third Circuit’s
decision, a jury, presumably, would be cautioned to consider the affirmative-defense evidence only in reaching a decision on the
hostile work environment claim, and to ignore or at least downplay that same evidence in deciding the closely associated
constructive discharge claim. It makes scant sense thus to alter the decisive instructions from one claim to the next when the
only variation between the two claims is the severity of the hostile working conditions.
If the plaintiff had resigned in response to an official act on the part of the employer, would the result have been
different? Yes, or at least the holding would have been different. Neither the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit nor the
United States Supreme Court would have allowed the defendant to assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense if Suders’
resignation had occurred as the result of the employer’s official act. There would have been no need for either court to
determine the application of that defense in a situation involving constructive discharge.
ANSWERS TO ESSAY QUESTIONS IN
STUDY GUIDE TO ACCOMPANY BUSINESS LAW, TWELFTH EDITION
BY HOLLOWELL & MILLER
1. Compare and contrast disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination and Title VII’s response to each in the
context of employment. Disparate-treatment discrimination is blatant discrimination. Disparate-impact discrimination is when