Business Law Chapter 33 Homework Salibas The Time Entered Into Contract With

ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS

CHAPTER 33

AGENCY LIABILITY AND TERMINATION

33-1A. Respondeat superior

(Chapter 33—Pages 651)

The court held that the dealership was not liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the acts of its

33-2A. Authority of agent

(Chapter 33—Pages 641–644)

The court concluded that FLB’s attorney had actual authority to settle the case and that the settlement

agreement was thus binding. “It is well settled that actual authority can be created by the acquiescence

B-138 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 33

33-3A. Apparent authority

(Chapter 33—Pages 641–644)

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the decision of the trial court (which had directed a verdict

for RRC, holding, among other things, that Kelby failed to give notice of his inability to perform because

33-4A. Ratification by principal

(Chapter 33—Pages 644–645)

One of the requirements for ratification is that the principal must know of all material facts involved in

the transaction. Van Stavern did not have knowledge of Hash’s conduct. Van Stavern did not know that

33-5A. Respondeat superior

(Chapter 33—Page 650)

The court found that Hallgren was not acting within the scope of employment when she disclosed

33-6A. Implied authority

(Chapter 33—Page 641)

A settlement agreement is most likely enforceable when a client authorizes his or her attorney to

negotiate a final deal, even if the client does not literally consent to all the final negotiated terms. For

33-7A. Undisclosed principal

(Chapter 33—Page 646)

The court found that Dunning had agreed to be personally liable for the rent at the outset of his lease

33-8A. Liability for employee’s acts

(Chapter 33—Pages 641–644)

The court ruled in favor of Federated and Jones appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

B-140 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 33

through its agents, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a company would ever be found to have

willfully violated the statute directly by obtaining a credit report for an impermissible purpose. The

33-9A. Liability for independent contractor’s torts

(Chapter 33—Page 651)

The court granted Greif’s motion, holding that even if Pusey’s death was the result of YSP’s negligence,

Greif was not liable because YSP was an independent contractor and, as a general rule, an employer is

not liable for the negligent acts of its independent contractor. Pusey’s mother appealed to a state

33-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS

1. The court noted that “[t]he central question to be decided . . . is which innocent party, the

owner whose agent acted contrary to instruction, or the potential [buyer] who felt the direct harm of

the agent’s discriminatory failure to offer the residence for [sale], will ultimately bear the burden of the

harm caused.” The court concluded that the Fair Housing Act’s “overriding societal priority” requires

2. The court acknowledged that punitive damages can be assessed against a principal under the

doctrine of respondeat superior if the principal knew of or ratified the acts of its employees or agents.

But the court found no evidence to suggest that Ernst knew of or ratified the agents’ discriminatory ac–

tions. “In fact, the record reveals that Ernst affirmatively worked against discrimination in housing. Not

3. Based on allegations that racial steering by real estate agents destabilized the community and

increased the burden on the city in the form of increased crime and erosion of the tax base, and that the

city’s fair housing agency had to use its scarce resources to insure compliance with the fair housing laws