ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 3
COURT PROCEDURES
3-1A. Jury selection
(Chapter 3—Page 61)
The court of appeals held that the prosecutor’s statement indicating that he exercised peremptory
3-2A. Discovery
(Chapter 3—Pages 58–61)
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Stout’s action. The appellate court stated that
3-3A. Motion for summary judgment
(Chapter 3—Pages 57–58)
B-8 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 3
opinion in this case was mostly a summary of Hoag’s drinking habits. Hoag had testified that over the
two-year period prior to the accident, he (1) normally consumed a case of beer during the day while on
3-4A. Motion for a new trial
(Chapter 3—Page 66)
The state trial court denied the motion, holding that the juror’s “inadvertent” failure to respond to a
question during voir dire did not “rise to the level of juror misconduct which would require the grant of a
3-5A. Motion to dismiss
(Chapter 3—Pages 56–57)
3-6A. Jury trials
(Chapter 3—Page 61)
Yes, the suspension of civil jury trials for a period of three and a half months for budgetary reasons does
violate the Seventh Amendment. The court stated that the Seventh Amendment is violated whenever
3-7A. Jury selection
(Chapter 3—Page 61)
The judge refused to strike Leiter for cause, and then collectively asked the jurors who were selected to
hear the case, including Leiter, whether they would follow his instructions on the law even if they did
3-8A. Motion for judgment n.o.v.
(Chapter 3—Page 67)
Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict in Adams’s favor and awarded him damages in the amount of
$7,500. The court denied Uno’s motion (which, in Rhode Island, is referred to as a motion for judgment
3-9A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual
will be biased in a particular case solely because that person happens to be a woman or a man. The
2. On the one hand, it can be said that whether a trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well
as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are fair and free from
discrimination. On the other hand, some agree, with Justice Scalia in his dissent in this case, that the
3. It can be argued, as the Supreme Court held in this case, that the conclusion that litigants may
not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory
challenges. So long as gender does not serve as a proxy for bias, unacceptable jurors may still be