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ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 3
COURT PROCEDURES
3-1A. Jury selection
The court of appeals held that the prosecutor’s statement indicating that he exercised
peremptory challenges against two unmarried female prospective jurors because he was
3-2A. Discovery
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Stout’s action. The appellate court
stated that trial courts are permitted to impose sanctions—ranging from an award of expenses
3-3A. Motion for summary judgment
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The evidence was sufficient
to indicate that it was a question of fact whether the bar knew that Hoag was an alcoholic.
B-2 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 3
3-4A. Motion for a new trial
The state trial court denied the motion, holding that the juror’s “inadvertent” failure to respond to
a question during voir dire did not “rise to the level of juror misconduct which would require the
grant of a new trial.” Hummel appealed. The state intermediate appellate court held that the
juror’s failure to hear the question violated the juror’s duty to be attentive during voir dire
proceedings. The trial court’s decision was thus reversed. The appellate court stressed how
3-5A. Motion to dismiss
Yes, because the complaint is insufficient. Basically, a motion to dismiss (or demurrer) is an al-
3-6A. Jury trials
Yes, the suspension of civil jury trials for a period of three and a half months for budgetary
reasons does violate the Seventh Amendment. The court stated that the Seventh Amendment
is violated whenever an individual is not afforded, for a significant period of time, a jury trial that
he or she would otherwise receive. Three and a half months were construed to be more than a
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 3 B-3
3-7A. Jury selection
The judge refused to strike Leiter for cause, and then collectively asked the jurors who were
selected to hear the case, including Leiter, whether they would follow his instructions on the law
even if they did not agree with them and whether they would be able to suspend judgment until
they had heard all the evidence. All of them nodded their heads or said yes, and Leiter was
3-8A. Motion for judgment n.o.v.
Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict in Adams’s favor and awarded him damages in the
amount of $7,500. The court denied Uno’s motion (which, in Rhode Island, is referred to as a
motion for judgment as a matter of law). Uno appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The
3-9A. Discovery
A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny the requests of the parties that appear before
it. In this case, the court should deny the plaintiff’s request to lift the protective order. The court
granted her first request for a four-month delay to complete discovery. The plaintiff made her
B-4 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 3
3-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption
that an individual will be biased in a particular case solely because that person happens to be a
woman or a man. The Court concluded that the state’s gender-based peremptory challenges
could not survive the higher standard of equal-protection scrutiny that the Court affords dis-
virtually unsupported and was based on “the very stereotypes the law condemns.”
2. On the one hand, it can be said that whether a trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors,
as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are fair and
free from discrimination. On the other hand, some agree, with Justice Scalia in his dissent in
3. It can be argued, as the Supreme Court held in this case, that the conclusion that
litigants may not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the
elimination of all peremptory challenges. So long as gender does not serve as a proxy for bias,
unacceptable jurors may still be removed, including those who are members of a group or class
