4.
In September 2000, before Textron agreed to finance Rebel’s purchase of the Snorkel equipment, Snorkel filed a
financing statement covering its equipment “plus all proceeds derived therefrom.” Textron argued that it succeeded to Snorkel’s
interest when Textron agreed to finance the deal. If 4 Textron were subrogated to Snorkel’s rights, did Snorkel’s use of
“proceeds” in its financing statement include Rebel’s revenue from the leases? No, said the court, which discussed the question
at length. The definition of “proceeds” in the unrevised UCC 9–306(1) did not expressly include “rental income,” and the court
refused to construe the statute to impliedly include it. The court reasoned that the reference in the statute to “disposition of
collateral,” in relation to “proceeds,” covered only those goods for which there had been a “permanent or final conversion, not
a temporary use.” As the court adds, in revised Article 9, in UCC 9–102(64), the definition of “proceeds” was changed to include
“whatever is acquired upon the . . . lease . . . of collateral.”
Footnote 9: Hook & Motter, Inc., is an auto dealer in Ohio that does business as Dublin Auto Sales. Dublin Auto
granted a security interest in its inventory to Heartland Bank for a $300,000 line of credit. Heartland perfected its security
interest by filing. Dublin Auto used some of its credit to buy a 1997 Ford F-150 and a 1999 Jeep Cherokee. Dublin Auto sold the
F-150 to Joe and Michael Murphy, and the Jeep to Michael Laxton. National City Bank financed both purchases. Heartland
received none of the funds from the sales and consequently filed a suit in an Ohio state court against National City and others,
seeking a declaration that its security interest in the vehicles took priority. The court ruled in National City’s favor. Heartland
appealed. In Heartland Bank v. National City Bank, a state intermediate appellate court affirmed. Under UCC 9–320(a)—which
applied to the security interest in the vehicles in this case because a dealer held those vehicles as inventory for sale—
Heartland’s interest was extinguished on the sale of the vehicles to the Murphys and Laxton, who met the definition of buyers in
the ordinary course of business. Under the UCC “a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest
created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.”
The court in the Heartland case ruled that the UCC controls over other state law with respect to security interests in
motor vehicles held as inventory for sale by dealers. This is also made clear in Comment 4 to UCC 9-311, which states
Inventory Covered by Certificate of Title. Under [UCC 9-311(d) ], perfection of a security interest in the
inventory of a person in the business of selling goods of that kind is governed by the normal perfection rules, even if
Would it have affected the outcome in this case if the title certificates had been filed in a database that could be
accessed online? Explain. No. In fact, R.C. 4505.13(A)(2)—which the court relied on to establish that the UCC’s provisions take
precedence in the circumstances of this case—provides no exception for the “entry of a notation of the security interest into the
automated title processing system if a physical certificate of title for the motor vehicle has not been issued.”