CHAPTER 26: TRANSFERABILITY AND HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 15
and others, seeking in part the amount of the two checks, asserting that they were payable jointly. The court issued a
summary judgment in the bank’s favor. J & D and Hyatt appealed. In Hyatt Corp. v. Palm Beach National Bank, a
state intermediate appellate court affirmed. UCC 3–110(d) provides, “If an instrument payable to two or more persons
is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons
alternatively.” Under the previous version of this provision, if an ambiguity existed as to whether multiple payees were
intended as joint or alternative payees, they were deemed joint payees, but an amendment “reverse[d] the prior rule.”
Under the previous version of this provision [UCC 3–116], if an ambiguity existed as to whether multiple
payees were intended as joint or alternative payees, they were deemed joint payees. Earlier versions of alternative
and joint payee statutes were less clear. Other than negotiation, what is the significance of the UCC provision at
If a stacked payee designation was considered unambiguous and payable jointly before the amendment
of this provision of the UCC, should that same payee designation be considered unambiguous after the
Footnote 3: Vernon and Shirley Graves leased a commercial building in Indiana to John and Tamara
Johnson, who operated Johnson’s Towing & Recovery. The Johnsons’ insurer was Westport Insurance Co. A fire
destroyed the building in 2003. Westport hired Claims Management Services, Inc. (CMS), to pay the claim. On CMS’s
behalf, Robert Davis met with Vernon, who was acting as the rebuilding contractor, and agreed that Westport would
pay with three checks “co–payable” to Johnson’s Towing and Vernon. Westport gave two checks to Vernon, who
deposited them in his account. A third check was tendered to the Johnsons. They did not remit the funds to the
Graveses, who filed a suit in an Indiana state court against the Johnsons and Westport. The court entered a judgment
in Westport’s favor. The Graveses appealed. In Graves v. Johnson, a state intermediate appellate court affirmed.
Westport’s tender of the third check to the Johnsons suspended the insurance company’s obligation to both payees,
including the Graveses. Payment of the check “extinguished” the firm’s obligation on it. “[W]here one joint payee takes
and possesses a check, it suspends all obligations as to other joint payees not in actual possession of the check as
the party possessing the draft holds the draft for the benefit of himself and the other payee.”
Would it have made any difference to the outcome of this case if the Graveses had proved that the
Does a drawer who acts as Westport did—consulting with, and delivering the first two checks to, the
Graveses—create an ethical obligation with respect to the delivery of the third check? Why or why not? Yes,
because the Graveses depended on Westport, with whom they came to terms about the cost of the reconstruction, to
Is there a method, other than payment, that would have discharged Westport’s obligation as the drawer