CASE 21.3—QUESTIONS (PAGE 413)
WHAT IF THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT?
In Dare’s response to Houseman’s complaint, he admitted to orally promising her that she could have
the dog. Suppose that he had not admitted to this promise. On what principle should a trial court base a
finding that one of the parties is more credible on this point? A court must determine that “the assertion
of a special interest in possession is sincere and grounded in facts and circumstances which endow the
chattel [personal property] with a special . . . value” and is not based on “a sentiment assumed for the
purpose of litigation out of greed, ill-will or other sentiment or motive similarly unworthy of protection.”
This may be apparent from seeing the demeanor, and listening to the expressions, of a party testifying in
assertion of the interest. In Houseman’s case, the appellate court also cited her prompt attempt to
enforce her interest as evidence of her sincerity.
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION
What might the award to Houseman of the value of the dog instead of its possession mean to Dare, and
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS IN THE REVIEWING FEATURE
AT THE END OF THE CHAPTER
1A. Acceptance
Because Egan had accepted the previous shipments, and because they were, like this shipment, only 5
percent short and of a quality superior to that designated in the parties’ contract, GFI had a legitimate
reason to expect that Egan would accept the fourth shipment.
2A. Substitution of carriers
3A. Doctrine
The doctrine of commercial impracticability could be used to excuse GFI from further performance of its
contractual obligations. When the performance of a contract becomes extremely difficult due to an
unexpected occurrence, a party may invoke this doctrine to release it from performing an obligation that
might be impossible or financially ruinous. In this situation, because GFI cannot obtain the silicon
necessary to make enough chips to fulfill its obligations under the contract, it can ask the court to