B-88 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 21
negates Falco’s claim that as of 4:00 P.M. on January 23, it had reason to feel insecure as to whether Will
would perform the * * * [a]greement. Falco cannot rely upon its own conduct in not permitting the
21-3A. Limited remedies
(Chapter 21—Pages 415–416)
The court enforced the limitation–of-liability clause. The court pointed out that UCC 2–719 allows
contracting parties, “especially sophisticated, commercial entities,” to agree to the limitation of
21-4A. Limitation of remedies
(Chapter 21—Pages 415–416)
Figgie filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted, and Seralles appealed. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The appellate court
explained that there was a dispute over the wording of the contract but concluded that in the absence
of language to the contrary, the usage of trade in the industry in which these parties were involved
dictated a term limiting Seralles’s remedy to repair, replacement, or refund. Did this term, as Seralles
contended, fail in its essential purpose? The court acknowledged that if the provision had failed in its
2–719(1)(a)] and contemplated by the agreement. Serralles’ contention that a seller eliminates the
remedy of “refund” simply by electing to attempt repair or replacement is unpersuasive. On the