ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 18
PERFORMANCE AND DISCHARGE
18-1A. Impossibility of performance
The answer to whether the contract can be specifically enforced or John’s nonperformance can
18-2A. Performance
The court held in favor of Prentice-Hall. Zilg could not show that the decisions of Prentice-Hall
were other than sound and valid. In fact, the court held that the printing of 13,000 copies, an
18-3A. Frustration of purpose
The court granted summary judgment for Burlington against Coker’s claim. The court held that
the doctrine of frustration of purpose did not apply to this situation, stating that “the actions of
B-2 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 18
18-4A. Conditions precedent
The court held that the Williamses’ ability to obtain financing was a condition precedent to the
contract. The typewritten statement inserted into the preprinted contract made the language of
18-5A. Conditions precedent
The trial court dismissed McLanahan’s claim. On McLanahan’s appeal, the state appellate court
affirmed the decision. The court explained, “Mr. McLanahan knew of, and agreed to abide by,
18-6A. Performance
The court concluded that despite some minor defects, Tentinger had substantially performed the
painting job and awarded Tentinger $420 on his bill (plus $6,873.75 in attorney fees and
$900.02 in costs). McPheters appealed to a state intermediate appellate court, arguing that
Tentinger did not substantially perform the contract. This court affirmed the lower court’s award
and added the fees and costs of the appeal. The state intermediate appellate court explained
18-7A. Performance
The court dismissed the complaint, finding that Teramo’s performance was “unsatisfactory from
both a timely and skillful manner.” The court also awarded O’Brien lost profits, due to
construction delay, and $6,180 for damages due to faulty workmanship. A state intermediate
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 18 B-3
18-8A. Substantial performance
The court found that Pisani had not substantially performed its obligations under its construction
contract with the Kruegers and allowed them to retain the payment due under the contract.
Pisani appealed to a state intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the
lower court. The appellate court said, “Mere use of the building is not enough . . . for
substantial compliance to be found.” Here, “[b]ecause the building to be built by the plaintiff was
intended to be added to an existing building and the plaintiff was aware of that intention, . . .
18–9A. Conditions of performance
Maciel was not correct. In this problem, the performance of a legal obligation under the parties’
contract was contingent on a condition—the occurrence of a certain event. If the condition was
not satisfied, the obligations of the parties were discharged. Here, Regent University promised
B-4 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 18
18-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. In supporting the college’s position, you could argue, as has been done in several law
cases, that applying the commercial law concept of substantial performance to an academic
setting could foreseeably have unethical results, particularly in the areas of curriculum and
discipline. For example, what if a student performed his or her requirements in all respects but
one: the student cheated on two of the myriad exams taken during the four-year college pro-
gram. Would it be fair to say that that student “substantially performed”? Another example
would be students who plagiarize. What if a student had only plagiarized twice and refrained
from doing so on all other written assignments? Had the student substantially performed the
work? Normally, university administrations and staff members do not look kindly on plagiarism,
and students have been dismissed from college for lesser offenses. But if the substantial per–
2. The court conceded that it would be inappropriate in many cases to apply the concept
of substantial performance to the performance of college students. In the court’s view, however,
Russell’s case differed significantly from those cases. According to the court, “The College, the
jury found, forced Russell into voluntary withdrawal because she was obese, and for no other