ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS
CHAPTER 17
PERFORMANCE AND DISCHARGE
IN TRADITIONAL AND E-CONTRACTS
17-1A. Impossibility of performance
(Chapter 17—Page 327)
17-2A. Performance
(Chapter 17—Page 321)
The court held in favor of Prentice-Hall. Zilg could not show that the decisions of Prentice-Hall were
17-3A. Frustration of purpose
(Chapter 17—Page 330)
B-72 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 17
purpose of its contract with Burlington, which was the conveyance of the looms from Burlington to
Coker.” Furthermore, the court noted, the doctrine of frustration of purpose, even if applicable, “would
17-4A. Conditions precedent
(Chapter 17—Pages 319–320)
The court held that the Williamses’ ability to obtain financing was a condition precedent to the contract.
17-5A. Substantial performance
(Chapter 17—Pages 321–322)
The ordinary rule applied in cases involving building contracts is that a builder is not required to perform
17-6A. Conditions precedent
(Chapter 17—Pages 319–320)
The trial court dismissed McLanahan’s claim. On McLanahan’s appeal, the state appellate court affirmed
17-7A. Performance
(Chapter 17—Pages 321–322)
The court concluded that despite some minor defects, Tentinger had substantially performed the
painting job and awarded Tentinger $420 on his bill (plus $6,873.75 in attorney fees and $900.02 in
17-8A. Performance
(Chapter 17—Page 325)
The court dismissed the complaint, finding that Teramo’s performance was “unsatisfactory from both a
timely and skillful manner.” The court also awarded O’Brien lost profits, due to construction delay, and
17-9A. Substantial performance
(Chapter 17—Pages 321–322)
The court found that Pisani had not substantially performed its obligations under its construction
B-74 APPENDIX B: ALTERNATE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERS—CHAPTER 17
that, in the ordinary case, being a few inches off on the height of the building would not be sufficient to
defeat substantial compliance with the contract, in this case the plaintiff knew of the need for
17-10A. A QUESTION OF ETHICS
1. In supporting the college’s position, you could argue, as has been done in several law cases,
that applying the commercial law concept of substantial performance to an academic setting could
foreseeably have unethical results, particularly in the areas of curriculum and discipline. For example,
what if a student performed his or her requirements in all respects but one: the student cheated on two
of the myriad exams taken during the four-year college program. Would it be fair to say that that
student “substantially performed”? Another example would be students who plagiarize. What if a
student had only plagiarized twice and refrained from doing so on all other written assignments? Had
the student substantially performed the work? Normally, university administrations and staff members
2. The court conceded that it would be inappropriate in many cases to apply the concept of
substantial performance to the performance of college students. In the court’s view, however, Russell’s
case differed significantly from those cases. According to the court, “The College, the jury found, forced