initiate contact with Greenspan. (Of course, theoretically, Minkow could have denied Ernst &
Whinney permission to make the standard SAS 7 inquiries of Greenspan.) As pointed out in the case,
Ernst & Whinney representatives subsequently disputed Greenspan’s testimony by reporting that
they, in fact, had communicated with him prior to accepting ZZZZ Best as a client. However, the
Ernst & Whinney representatives did not testify as to the content or results of those communications.
Following the resignation of Ernst & Whinney, Price Waterhouse contacted that firm and
5. The confidentiality agreement certainly imposed restrictions on the ability of Ernst & Whinney
to corroborate the evidence collected during the site visitations. The second stipulation of that
agreement, shown in Exhibit 3, was particularly limiting. The inability of Ernst & Whinney to
contact the building owner, the insurance company, and other companies or individuals allegedly
involved in, or associated with, the restoration projects precluded the auditors from obtaining
evidence from independent third parties to resolve any questions or issues raised as a result of the
site visitations. Whether the confidentiality agreement improperly limited the scope of Ernst &
Whinney’s audit is a matter of professional judgment. Apparently, members of the audit engagement
team did not believe that the scope of the ZZZZ Best audit was improperly restricted by the
agreement, otherwise they would not have complied with it.