At a time when Western networks had virtually no one available to cover Egypt, AJE had
multiple reporters on the ground and numerous video feeds coming in. 140 One of the most fascinating
discrepancies was that between an Egyptian television broadcast showing a section of Cairo at peace
and AJE video that showed sections of the city in flames. What’s more, AJE’s access was not limited to
Egypt’s capital city of Cairo. The network also had reporters on the ground in the Egyptian cities of Suez
and Alexandria.
As the protests continued, it became difficult for even Al Jazeera to report the news, as the
Egyptian government revoked the network’s license to broadcast from Egypt and pulled the
accreditation of its reporters. 141 Along with Al Jazeera, two other major sources of news about the
protests were SMS text messages and social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook. Some
commentators in Western media emphasized the role of social media in the uprising, calling the protests
the “Facebook Revolt.” But it’s important to remember, as journalist Philip N. Howard points out, that
while social networks certainly helped the protesters organize and share information, it was the
protesters themselves who put their lives on the line. He wrote: “Overemphasizing the role of
information technology diminishes the personal risks that individual protesters took in heading out onto
the streets to face tear gas and rubber bullets.”142 In his book Three Blind Mice, which is about the
American broadcast networks in transition during the 1980s and 1990s, media journalist Ken Auletta
talks about how the first Gulf War brought CNN to prominence:
It wasn’t until the war in the Persian Gulf began in January 1991 that the cable
revolution became dramatically apparent. Viewers realized that CNN, not the three
networks, was a primary source of up–to–the–minute news. And they were getting the
news the way they wanted it—instantly and without interruption from soap operas. For
as long as the war held their interest, viewers could choose for themselves when to
watch the news as easily as they could flick to an HBO movie, an ESPN basketball game,
or a Disney cartoon. 143
Unfortunately for Al Jazeera English, even the 2011 riots and protests in Egypt and the
subsequent Arab Spring protest movement were unable to bring permanent increases to the number of
American viewers. In 2013, Al Jazeera purchased former vice president Al Gore’s Current cable network
and rebranded it as Al Jazeera America, thus giving the network access to about 60% of American
households. But when that happened, cable providers carrying the new channel insisted that Al Jazeera
stop making its English–language video feed available for free online. So, although Al Jazeera America
now had more cable availability, many of the young, digitally literate viewers who viewed the channel
online were lost to the network. Ratings from the summer of 2014 showed Al Jazeera America as having
140 Alex Pareene, “Al Jazeera’s Egypt Coverage Embarrasses U.S. Cable News Channels,” Salon, January 28, 2011,
www.salon.com/2011/01/28/cable_news_egypt/.
141 “Egypt Shuts Down Al Jazeera Bureau,” Al Jazeera, January 30, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201113085252994161.html.
142 Philip N. Howard, “The Arab Spring’s Cascading Effects,” Pacific Standard, February 23, 2011,
www.psmag.com/politics/the–cascading–effects–of–the–arab–spring–28575/.
143 Ken Auletta, Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost Their Way (New York: Random House, 1991), 4.