condition was most consistent with a diagnosis of vascular dementia. He recommended ongoing
monitoring.
A second physician stated without qualification in November 2006 that the diagnosis was
Alzheimer’s dementia.
Before Watson executed the first trust amendment, she was no longer able to care for herself. She
needed help with all of her daily living activities, including walking, bathing, dressing, preparing
meals, using the telephone, driving, getting in and out of the car, and walking up and down stairs.
By May 2007, at a family gathering, Watson did not recognize the children of one of her brothers
and other previously known family members.
Roughly one month after leaving the hospital following a hospitalization, on July 27, 2007, Watson
signed the first trust amendment decreasing the Ivies’ share of her property and granting Smith a
share. Each of the Ivies would now receive $25,000 upon her death. Smith would receive the
remainder. The amendment also added a “no-contest” clause, the purpose of which was to cause
anyone challenging the trust to lose his or her share.
Watson’s mental health continued to worsen. At some point after July 2007, she visited one of her
neighbors and took off her own clothes in the neighbor’s living room. In-home nurses’ reports reflect
that Watson’s dementia was uncontrolled, she was paranoid, and experienced forgetfulness and
mood swings.
From early December 2007 to mid-January 2008, Watson retitled her checking account and money
market account from the trust to her own name individually and signed documents to “pay on
death” to Smith. Watson removed the Ivies from all accounts and beneficiary status.
The in-home nursing staff noted that her forgetfulness continued and that she had bouts of
confusion. In late January, she asked Smith, “Am I still your wife? Are we married?” In late March,
she was disoriented in her home and could not find the bathroom. In April, she wanted her lawn
hand-pulled instead of mowed. In May, she was hospitalized after falling, and hospital reports
repeatedly showed that she was “Confused/Disoriented/Senile/Irrational/Non–Compliant.” On June
5, back at home, Watson said that she saw a baby while staring at the ceiling and that she was
hearing voices.
Watson lived in a nursing home until July 2, 2008, which was the day she signed the second trust
amendment. The second trust amendment, which Young also prepared, further reduced the Ivies’
shares in the trust estate and increased Smith’s share. Because Reginald Young recognized that
Watson’s mental health had deteriorated and because he anticipated controversy over the changes
to Watson’s estate plan, he prepared a memorandum for his file stating that he believed she
understood what she was doing.
Watson died April 10, 2009. After Watson’s death, the Ivies filed to set aside the trust amendments,
beneficiary designations, and various property transfers. The court entered judgment for the Ivies.
The court found that Watson lacked testamentary capacity with regard to her estate plan. Smith
appealed.
ISSUE: Did Watson have capacity to make the changes in her estate?
REASONING: There was substantial evidence to support a finding that Watson lacked testamentary capacity to
make the changes to her estate plan. Although the testamentary capacity standard takes into
account the ability of persons who have been diagnosed with some form of mental defect to make
a valid will or trust, it remains a factual issue of whether a person had testamentary capacity at the
particular time of execution. Lower courts are in the best position to decide precisely when a person
has testamentary capacity, and the bizarre and declining behaviors of the Testator indicate that she
did not understand what she was doing through the changes and to whom.
Affirmed.
c. Beneficiary – a guardian for minors may be required
3. Testamentary intent – intention to make provision that will be effective only on death