Fat Boy gave a ship mortgage on the Sea Ray yacht to Carolina First. Carolina First filed the
preferred ship mortgage on the Sea Ray yacht.
George Lee and Paul Degenhart, the lawyer for and principal in Fat Boy, became concerned that
the Sea Ray yacht may have been manufactured in 1996, not 1998, as previously indicated by Dey.
Lee and Degenhart confronted Dey about the incorrect model year of the Sea Ray yacht. Dey
admitted that he had altered the vessel’s HIN to disguise the actual manufacture date.
Fat Boy and Lee attempted to trade the Sea Ray yacht to a vessel dealer for another vessel that
Lee wanted to purchase. At that time, it was determined that the vessel had been stolen and Small
was informed. Small contacted Lee and Fat Boy, but Lee did not return the vessel to Small. In
June, 2004, the Sea Ray yacht was seized by the U.S. Marshal Service and Northern filed suit to
get the yacht back. Fat Boy and Carolina First claimed title and interest in the yacht.
ISSUES: Who has title to the yacht? What is the effect of having a thief in the chain of transfer of the goods?
REASONING: A thief cannot pass good title, even when the yacht identification number is changed. The rights of
all the parties, including the lender and the buyer, are all subordinate to the original owner of the
yacht. A party can pass only as good a title as he or she holds. A thief holds no title and cannot
pass good title, even to those who are not aware that the goods are stolen.
DISCUSSION POINTS: Have the students discuss the passage of title on stolen goods using the Northern
Insurance Company of New York v. 1996 Sea Ray Model 370DA Yacht case.
2. Authorization – lien holders can sell property when debtors default
3. Voidable title
a. Minor has title and transfers; transferee transfers to bfp
DISCUSSION POINTS: Ethics & the Law
The $7 Renoir at the Flea Market
Cover ethical issues of government taking of property and the implications of title for later holders of the property.
Here is the outcome of the case in a nutshell:
“The common law provides that possession of property constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership until a
better title is proven.” That presumption, undoubtedly, favors Fuqua on the facts presented here. She claims
to have purchased the painting in good faith at a flea market in West Virginia, and she possessed the
painting until the FBI seized it. See Adams, 672 S.E. 2d at 867. The burden thus lies with BMA, as the
claimant out of possession, to rebut Fuqua’s presumptive proof of ownership by “produc[ing] evidence of
superior title.” BMA does so by way of a detinue action, alleging that the painting was stolen from its
collection in November 1951.
The only conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented by BMA is that it was in lawful possession of
the painting until the painting was stolen from its collection in November 1951. To this end, BMA appended a
number of affidavits and supporting exhibits to its memorandum. Internal records, discussed above, indicate
that BMA received the painting as a loan from Saidie May, cataloged the painting, and put it on exhibit
before reporting it stolen. See BMA’s Mem., Ex. 1. Of particular significance is the police report, which
demonstrates that BMA reported the painting as stolen to the City of Baltimore Police Department on
November 17, 1951. See id. at Ex. 2. The theft is further corroborated by BMA’s records, including
handwritten and typed notations on the catalog card reflecting the painting’s status as stolen, id. at Ex. 1–C;
minutes from a board meeting stating that BMA made an insurance claim as a result of the theft, id. at Ex.
1–G; and BMA’s financial ledger confirming that it received a $2,500 payment from its insurer, id. at Ex. 1–H.
Together these records offer overwhelming evidence in support of BMA’s claim that the painting was stolen.
Given this quantum of evidence, there can be no doubt that BMA has proved all it must under Virginia law,
and that Fuqua cannot have good title as the possessor of a stolen work of art.