Forgery
It is illegal to forge an instrument or to pass on (utter) an instrument that one knows to be forged.
Discharge
Discharge means that liability on an instrument terminates. Article 3 establishes five different ways to
discharge an instrument:
By payment
By agreement
By cancellation
By certification
By alteration
Case: Manley v. Wachovia Small Bus. Capital2
Facts: File this case under:
What parents will do for their children (whether or not they should).
Wachovia Bank loaned Daniel Manley $420,000 and, in return, he gave the bank a promissory note in
that amount. His father, Thomas, guaranteed payment of the note. Seven years later, Daniel stopped
making payments, so Wachovia sent him a default notice. When he did not resume payments, the
bank filed suit to collect the money owed.
At trial, Thomas testified that, shortly after Daniel received his first default notice, he had taken
$375,000 in $100 bills to Wachovia as a payment on the note. Thomas further testified that he had asked
for a receipt from the bank em
ployee to whom he had given the cash but the employee had told him
that a receipt would be mailed to him after the cash was counted. Thomas
never got a receipt but,
three months later, Daniel received the original note in the mail. It was in a Wachovia envelope and had
been stamped “Paid.”
Wachovia employees testified they had no record of a $375,000 cash payment and that the note had
never been paid. Nor could they find the original note. They had no idea who had marked the note paid,
or how Daniel had possession of it.
The jury did not believe Thomas .It found both Daniel and Thomas liable on the note .The father and
son appealed. They argued that, because Wachovia had marked the note “paid,” it had been
discharged and they were no longer liable on it.
Issues: Was the note discharged? Were the Manley men liable on it?
Excerpts from Justice Moseley’s Decision:3
The Manleys rely on [Section 3.604 of the UCC], which provides that the person entitled to enforce the
instrument may discharge the obligation by an intentional voluntary act. The Manleys contend
Wachovia’s acts of stamping the original note “paid and sending it to Daniel were intentional and
voluntary and are conclusive evidence that Wachovia discharged the note. [T]hey assert that only the act
(stamping and returning the note) must be intentional and voluntary, not the result (discharge of the
obligation). We disagree.
Discharge requires the intent to render the instrument ineffective as a legal obligation. This intent
requirement has led courts
to conclude that mistakenly marking a note “paid (or the
equivalent) will
not discharge the debt.
There is evidence that although the note was stamped paid
, it had not, in fact, been paid and amounts
remained due and owing at the time of
trial. There is also evidence Wachovia’s normal procedures
following the payment of a note were not fol
lowed in this case, and [an employee] testified that it was
a mistake for Daniel to receive the note. This, along with other evidence in the record, is some
evidence that the surrender of the note and stamping it paid were the result of a mistake and not
intentional or voluntary.
2 349 S.W.3d 233 Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011
3 For ease of reading the opinion, we have substituted “the Manleys” for “Appellants.”