CHAPTER 31: WILLS AND TRUSTS 9
in whole or in part.
federal court cannot dispose of the property. But a federal court can adjudicate matters “outside
those confines and within federal jurisdiction.” Vickie’s claim against Pierce was a “widely
recognized tort” that did not involve the administration or probate of an estate. And “Texas may
not reserve to its probate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate a transitory tort.” The federal
district court thus “properly asserted jurisdiction.”
(c) The bankruptcy court issued a judgment in favor of Vickie on Pierce’s claim and
her counterclaim. The court awarded her compensatory damages of more than $449 million—
less whatever she recovered in the proceedings in Texas—and $25 million in punitive damages.
On Pierce’s appeal from the bankruptcy court, a federal district court ruled that he had
tortiously interfered with Vickie’s “expectancy.” The court found that J. Howard directed his
lawyers to prepare for Vickie an inter vivos trust consisting of half the appreciation of his assets
from the date of their marriage. Pierce conspired to suppress or destroy the trust and to strip J.
Howard of his assets by backdating, altering, and otherwise falsifying documents, arranging for
the surveillance of J. Howard and Vickie, and presenting documents to J. Howard under false
pretenses. The court reduced her award, however, to $44.3 million in compensatory damages
and an equal amount in punitive damages.
As explained in the answer to the previous question, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the result, but the United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Ultimately, if the bankruptcy
court’s decision is determined to be a “core” judgment, it could be reinstated. This outcome
might see the case being appealed again to the Supreme Court.
(d) If a child is born after a will is executed, and it appears that the testator would have
provided for the child, the child is entitled to whatever portion of the estate she would have
received under the applicable state intestacy laws. Only if it appears that the testator intended to
disinherit the child would the child not be allowed take an intestate share. In Vickie’s will, there is
a clause that seems to disinherit future children, but it has been disputed as language carelessly
copied from a will form and thus arguably not enforceable.
If a beneficiary dies before the testator, or as in this case when a child dies before his
parent and there is a surviving sister, the sole sibling may inherit the deceased beneficiary’s
share. Thus, here, Vickie’s daughter may be the heir to whatever share of J. Howard’s assets
Vickie’s estate ultimately receives, as well as whatever her estate is finally awarded on her
personal claim against Pierce.
31–9A. LEGAL REASONING GROUP ACTIVITY—Intestacy laws
(a) The court should decide the inheritance rights of children conceived from the
sperm of a deceased individual and his surviving spouse based on the children’s genetic
relationship with the decedent, and whether the decedent consented both to reproduce
posthumously and to support any resulting child. Of course, if the state inheritance statutes limit
the class of posthumous children to those in utero at the time of the decedent’s death or have
certain other requirements, those standards must be met and applied. The purpose of the state
intestacy laws and other state and individual interests might be considered as well.
(b) It is in the best interest of the children conceived after a parent’s death (by means
of artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization) that those children have a right to inherit from