2 INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL FOR BUSINESS LAW: COMMERCIAL LAW FOR ACCOUNTANTS
A. CASE BACKGROUND
The text illustrates the point with an 1884 Kansas case in which a farmer who signed a note in reliance on
another’s false representations could not later avoid payment on the note to a third party who took the
note without notice of the fraud.
B. THE COURT’S DECISION
The court’s decision presaged the UCC’s position on the question. UCC 3-305(a)(1)(iii) states that fraud
is only a defense against an HDC if the injured party signed the instrument “with neither knowledge nor a
reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or essential terms.”
C. THE REASONING OF THE HDC CONCEPT
The HDC doctrine reflects the philosophy that when two or more innocent parties are at risk, the burden
should fall on the party that was in the best position to prevent the loss.
II. Good Faith in Negotiable Instruments Law
The text discusses good faith in the context of the HDC doctrine.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD FAITH
A 1998 Pennsylvania case, in which the court refused to apply the fictitious payee rule because a bank
did not act in good faith is offered as an example of good faith in this context.
B. HOW SHOULD GOOD FAITH BE TESTED?
The text sketches two answers to the question of how good faith should be measured—subjectively or
objectively—and how those answers might affect HDC status differently.
C. CRITICISMS OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD
Some observers claim the objective test that requires the “observance of reasonable commercial
standards” is to imprecise, relative, or ambiguous. A good faith argument is thus always possible, leading
to potential litigation.
D. HOW GOOD FAITH STANDARDS CAN AFFECT HDC STATUS
Whether the subjective or objective test is used can affect HDC status. The text includes an example.
III. Efficiency versus Due Care
The text highlights the problem of signature verification on the billions of checks processed every month.
Does a bank exercise ordinary care if it follows the prevailing industry practice of examining
signatures on only a few, randomly selected checks over a certain amount?
Under the unrevised Article 3, some courts held that banks do not breach their duty of care by adhering to a
practice that is cost-effective and customary within the industry. Others reasoned that banks are supposed to
verify all signatures on all checks. The revised Article 3, in UCC 3–103(a)(7), states that “[i]n the case of a