20 INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL FOR BUSINESS LAW: COMMERCIAL LAW FOR ACCOUNTANTS
whole or in part.
Footnote 3: ATM Corp. of America, Inc. (ATM), manages settlement services for national lenders. Francis
credit-card statements, among other duties. Over a seven-year period, Vanek took unauthorized cash advances from
Azur’s credit-card account with Chase Bank. The charges appeared on at least sixty-five monthly billing statements.
When Azur discovered Vanek‘s fraud, he terminated her and closed the account. Azur filed a suit in a federal district
court against Chase, seeking reimbursement. The court issued a judgment in Chase’s favor. Azur appealed. In Azur
v. Chase Bank, USA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Azur vested Vanek with apparent
express consent. Would the court’s decision have been different? Why or why not? Probably not, because
apparent authority exists when the principal cause a third party reasonably to believe that the agent has the authority
to act. If Azur had not expressly consented to the withdrawals, but had allowed what he might have seen as few in
number to occur—perhaps because he valued Vanek’s services—Chase might have even more reasonably believed
that Vanek acted under apparent authority.
best efforts—including the use of a computerized fraud-detection system known as FALCON, apparently the best
system in the industry, and messages left on three occasions on Azur’s home telephone number’s voicemail (to
which, apparently, Vanek ultimately responded)—Chase was unable to detect Vanek’s fraud. As the court in this case
noted, by including the “apparent authority” provision in the TILA, “Congress recognized that the cardholder is
oftentimes in the best position to identify fraud committed by its employees.” Certainly, in this case the cardholder
for negligence. The court dismissed Hoggatt as a party. A jury found SDI liable and awarded $3,825 in damages to
Warner. She appealed. In Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC, a state intermediate appellate court held that
Hoggatt should not have been dismissed. Hoggatt’s agent status did not excuse him from liability for negligence when
evidence indicated that he ignored the herbicide maker’s instructions. An agent is not excused from responsibility for
tortious conduct just because he is working for a principal.
finding of a duty, or its lack, might be the hinge on which liability in these circumstances would turn. What is the
degree of care that should have been exercised, considering the occupation of the defendants, their