392 F.3d 55, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,004, 59 ERC 1801
Briefs and Other Related Documents
United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.
RIVERDALE MILLS CORP. and James M. Knott, Sr., Plaintiffs,
Appellees,
Justin PIMPARE and Daniel Granz, Defendants, Appellants,
United States; Three Unknown Named Agents of the United States
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
The EPA decided to look into it. On the morning of October, 21, 1997,
the Agency sent Pimpare and Granz to the mill to perform an inspection.
The two inspectors did not obtain a search warrant, and there is no claim
of exigent circumstances. Inspector Pimpare first met with Knott and
two high-level employees; Inspector Granz *58 arrived sometime during
that opening meeting. At that meeting, Pimpare did not assert any
statutory authority to search Riverdale property but instead asked Knott
given only on condition that the agents be so accompanied at all times.
FN3 See Knott, 256 F.3d at 23. At some point during the day, Knott also
told the inspectors that he owned the sewer lines under Manhole 1 and
Pimpare stated in an affidavit, however, that he understood Knott
merely to be indicating that Knott and the Riverdale employees
would “walk [Pimpare and Granz] around the premises,” not that
The inspectors had earlier planned on setting up a 24-hour composite
sample, but this was not done. The reason why this was not done is in
accoun
t. His
affidavit
states
that
Pimpar
e told
him 24–
becaus
e it
would
street.
Knott
says he
proble
m,
which
a reasonable officer would have understood that he was exceeding the
scope of Knott’s consent. Id. The court also noted that a reasonable
officer would have known that in the absence of consent, a warrant was
[1] [2] We have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
qualified immunity, where, as here, the denial rests on purely legal
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271
(1986).
See Abreu-Guzman, 241 F.3d at 73. The three-part test asks first:
“Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”
F
N
5
,
t
h
a
n
p
r
o
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
The EPA decided to look into it. On the morning of October, 21, 1997,
the Agency sent Pimpare and Granz to the mill to perform an inspection.
The two inspectors did not obtain a search warrant, and there is no claim
of exigent circumstances. Inspector Pimpare first met with Knott and
two high-level employees; Inspector Granz *58 arrived sometime during
that opening meeting. At that meeting, Pimpare did not assert any
statutory authority to search Riverdale property but instead asked Knott
given only on condition that the agents be so accompanied at all times.
FN3 See Knott, 256 F.3d at 23. At some point during the day, Knott also
told the inspectors that he owned the sewer lines under Manhole 1 and
Pimpare stated in an affidavit, however, that he understood Knott
merely to be indicating that Knott and the Riverdale employees
would “walk [Pimpare and Granz] around the premises,” not that
The inspectors had earlier planned on setting up a 24-hour composite
sample, but this was not done. The reason why this was not done is in
accoun
t. His
affidavit
states
that
Pimpar
e told
him 24–
becaus
e it
would
street.
Knott
says he
proble
m,
which
a reasonable officer would have understood that he was exceeding the
scope of Knott’s consent. Id. The court also noted that a reasonable
officer would have known that in the absence of consent, a warrant was
[1] [2] We have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
qualified immunity, where, as here, the denial rests on purely legal
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271
(1986).
See Abreu-Guzman, 241 F.3d at 73. The three-part test asks first:
“Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”
F
N
5
,
t
h
a
n
p
r
o