An expert testified that he had “ ‘never seen another dump
truck not be able to steer when stationary on concrete’ and
that the truck‘s steering problems were ‘consistent with a
ii. Evidence of Warranty‘s Terms
¶ 47 We turn to Kia’s argument that Schweiger failed
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Indeed, their disagreement was apparent from the begin-
change of letters Then, as Kia argues, Schweiger in-
formed Kia that he was “willing to resolve this matter for
the correctly calculated refund” in addition to $1,800 in
most, the parties exchanged unaccepted offers of settle-
ment. Because Schweiger bases his failure-to-refund
claim on the alleged breach of this non-existent settlement
jury’s damages finding based on its conclusion that the
only credible evidence on this issue was Schweiger’s ex-
pert’s testimony that the vehicle’s value was diminished
ing is the same sufficiency of the evidence test we would
ordinarily apply to jury findings. See id., ¶¶ 19–20 (citing
Morden, 235 Wis.2d 325, ¶¶ 38–39). Thus, if there is
ing had to be based on the difference between the value of
Schweiger’s vehicle if it had operated as warranted and
the value of the vehicle with the defect. The jury was in-
received “nothing” in return for her money, and testimony
by Schweiger that he was concerned about selling or trad-
ing the vehicle. Schweiger argues that the jury could have
“some reasonable basis of computation.” Id. Here, we
agree with the circuit court and Kia that the only reasona–
ble and non-speculative evidence of damages was the
be made to justify a jury finding of diminished value of
virtually any amount up to the purchase price of the vehi-
cle.
value. See Mayberry, 278 Wis.2d 39, ¶ 42; D‘Huyvetter,
164 Wis.2d at 323. More specifically, in Mayberry, a ve-
hicle owner submitted an affidavit including her lay opin-
ion as to the value of her vehicle. Mayberry, 278 Wis.2d
The court explained that the owner’s testimony was the
“only evidence … produced regarding the actual value.”
Id. at 323.
was being offered as evidence of value, nor does Schwei-
ger point to anything in the record to convince us that a
jury would have reasonably interpreted it that way. In
particular, when read in context, Kirichkow’s “nothing”
that testimony had been offered as evidence of value, it
was too speculative and general to support any particular
damages award. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit
court properly reduced the jury’s damages finding to con-
as evidence of value because Schweiger repre-
sented to the circuit court and Kia before trial
that Kirichkow would not offer an opinion on
value at trial.
torney’s fees and costs incurred since the time of
the circuit court‘s partial judgment, filed August
17, 2011. This request for additional attorney’s
fees should be directed in the first instance to the
ports.
Wis.App.,2013.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Indeed, their disagreement was apparent from the begin-
change of letters Then, as Kia argues, Schweiger in-
formed Kia that he was “willing to resolve this matter for
the correctly calculated refund” in addition to $1,800 in
most, the parties exchanged unaccepted offers of settle-
ment. Because Schweiger bases his failure-to-refund
claim on the alleged breach of this non-existent settlement
jury’s damages finding based on its conclusion that the
only credible evidence on this issue was Schweiger’s ex-
pert’s testimony that the vehicle’s value was diminished
ing is the same sufficiency of the evidence test we would
ordinarily apply to jury findings. See id., ¶¶ 19–20 (citing
Morden, 235 Wis.2d 325, ¶¶ 38–39). Thus, if there is
ing had to be based on the difference between the value of
Schweiger’s vehicle if it had operated as warranted and
the value of the vehicle with the defect. The jury was in-
received “nothing” in return for her money, and testimony
by Schweiger that he was concerned about selling or trad-
ing the vehicle. Schweiger argues that the jury could have
“some reasonable basis of computation.” Id. Here, we
agree with the circuit court and Kia that the only reasona–
ble and non-speculative evidence of damages was the
be made to justify a jury finding of diminished value of
virtually any amount up to the purchase price of the vehi-
cle.
value. See Mayberry, 278 Wis.2d 39, ¶ 42; D‘Huyvetter,
164 Wis.2d at 323. More specifically, in Mayberry, a ve-
hicle owner submitted an affidavit including her lay opin-
ion as to the value of her vehicle. Mayberry, 278 Wis.2d
The court explained that the owner’s testimony was the
“only evidence … produced regarding the actual value.”
Id. at 323.
was being offered as evidence of value, nor does Schwei-
ger point to anything in the record to convince us that a
jury would have reasonably interpreted it that way. In
particular, when read in context, Kirichkow’s “nothing”
that testimony had been offered as evidence of value, it
was too speculative and general to support any particular
damages award. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit
court properly reduced the jury’s damages finding to con-
as evidence of value because Schweiger repre-
sented to the circuit court and Kia before trial
that Kirichkow would not offer an opinion on
value at trial.
torney’s fees and costs incurred since the time of
the circuit court‘s partial judgment, filed August
17, 2011. This request for additional attorney’s
fees should be directed in the first instance to the
ports.
Wis.App.,2013.