978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-31-05

Fla.App. 1 Dist.,2009.

Contracts 95 152

95 Contracts

95II Construction and Operation

95II(A) General Rules of Construction

95k151 Language of Instrument

95k152 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Contract interpretation begins with a review of the plain language of the agreement because the contract language is

the best evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of the execution of the contract.

95k143 Application to Contracts in General

95k143(4) k. Subject, Object, or Purpose as Affecting Construction. Most Cited Cases

Contracts 95 143.5

[4] Evidence 157 448

157 Evidence

157XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings

[5] Appeal and Error 30 1010.1(10)

30 Appeal and Error

30XVI Review

30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and Findings

trial court’s factual findings regarding the parties‘ intent are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence.

[6] Husband and Wife 205 29(9)

Prenuptial agreement unambiguously waived wife’s right to elective share of husband‘s estate, intestate share, family

allowance, and all other rights generally afforded to surviving spouses, where agreement provided that husband’s

property would “forever remain his personal estate,” and that such property would be “forever free” of any claim by

wife. F.S.1995, § 732.702(1).

John G. Grimsley of Grimsley Marker & Iseley, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

ings below was the effect of a prenuptial agreement between Mary Ann Taylor, Appellee, and Louis Taylor, the

decedent. The trial court ruled that the prenuptial agreement had no effect on Appellee‘s right to partake in the dece-

dent’s intestate estate as his surviving spouse. This ruling was erroneous. Because the unambiguous language of the

prenuptial agreement provides that all property belonging to each spouse would “forever remain [his or her] person-

al estate” and that “said property shall remain forever free of claim by the other,” we hold that Appellee waived her

WHEREAS, the parties contemplate legal marriage under the laws of the State of Florida, and it is their mutual

desire to enter into this agreement so that they will continue to own and control their own property, and are getting

married because of their love for each other but do not desire that their present financial interest be changed by

their marriage.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows:

ried, to use, sell, enjoy, manage, gift and convey all property as may presently belong to him or her.

3. In the event of a separation or divorce, the parties shall have no right against each other by way of claims for sup-

port, alimony, maintenance, compensation or division of property existing of this date.

4. In the event of separation or divorce, marital property acquired after marriage shall nevertheless remain subject to

division, either by agreement or judicial determination.

5. This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties, their successors, assigns, and person-

al representatives.

This agreement shall be enforced with the laws of the State of Florida. Under this language, the agreement bears the

signatures of the decedent, Appellee, two witnesses, and a notary.

[1][2][3] A trial court’s interpretation of a prenuptial agreement is reviewed de novo, as such agreements are gov–

erned by the law of contracts. See Weisfeld-Ladd v. Estate of Ladd, 920 So.2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Con-

tract interpretation begins with a review of the plain language of the agreement because the contract language is the

best evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of the execution of the contract. Royal Oak Landing Homeowner’s

Ass’n, Inc. v. Pelletier, 620 So.2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In construing the language of a contract, courts are

biguous. See Weisfeld-Ladd, 920 So.2d at 1149–50; see also Acceleration Nat’l Svcs. Corp. v. Brickell Fin. Svcs.

Motor Club, Inc., 541 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“In the absence of an ambiguity on the face of a contract,

it is well settled that the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties, and the

plain meaning of that language controls.”). If parol evidence is properly admitted and the parties submit contradicto-

ry evidence regarding their intent, then the trial court’s factual findings regarding the parties’ intent are reviewed for

The right of election of a surviving spouse, the rights of the surviving spouse as intestate successor or as a pretermit-

ted spouse, and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead, exempt property, and family allowance, or any of

them, may be waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver,

signed by the waiving party. Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of “all rights,” or equivalent language, in

the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse, or a complete property settlement entered into after, or in

agreement was ambiguous as to Appellee’s rights in the decedent’s estate. Section 732.702(1) does not require that

the parties specify an intent to relinquish rights given to surviving spouses in order to effectively relinquish those

rights. Instead, the statute provides that a general relinquishment of “all rights” or equivalent language is sufficient

clear the parties’ intention that their marriage would not affect their financial interests. Paragraph two particularly

supports this conclusion, even though it would not have been sufficient, standing alone, to constitute a waiver of the

rights enumerated in section 732.702(1). Paragraph two, which provides that the parties were to retain “the full

right[s] and authority” over their property as they would have “if not married” shows that the parties intended for

their property to be treated as property belonging to an unmarried person. Additionally, while paragraphs three and

its meaning. Instead, it should have allowed the document to speak for itself. The prenuptial agreement was a valid

waiver of the rights enumerated in section 732.702(1), and the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions that the trial court vacate the order under review and

enter an order consistent with this opinion.