© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
to sell at a fair price. Once Macdonald Page rendered its negligent undervaluation of the Company, it
was too late-indeed, impossible-for Wetmore to choose to exercise that equally absolute right.
Wetmore’s allegations thus offer far more than “pure speculation or conjecture” as to Macdonald Page’s
improper valuation being a substantial factor in Wetmore’s asserted loss.
It should be added that Wetmore’s injury was entirely foreseeable. What Macdonald Page’s alleged
misfeasance imposed on Wetmore was precisely the type of bind that shareholders in a close corporation
seek to avoid when they include buy-sell provisions in their agreements. Protections afforded by buy-
sell provisions that set a bidding floor are fully meaningful only if the initial valuation of the company is
performed accurately. Otherwise, as here, the distortion of that base valuation skews the entire process.
“Shareholder’s and Officer’s Agreement” dated February 1, 1994, paragraph 11.5.5….
To argue that Wetmore’s loss was not foreseeable would be disingenuous, given that plain language
confirming Macdonald Page’s duty to the Company’s shareholders.
In its decision the district court also reasoned that if Macdonald Page’s valuation had been higher, there
is no guaranty that Ms. Holden would have made an offer. We too lack an unclouded crystal ball to tell
proof that remain unresolved, but those will require a more developed record-they simply are not before
us at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons that have been stated here we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Wetmore’s
complaint and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.