978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-24-03

subject Type Homework Help
subject Pages 15
subject Words 4088
subject Authors Roger LeRoy Miller

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page-pf1
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 1
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
page-pf2
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 2
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2002) (the
Act)). Section 2 of the Act states:
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the
or damaged thereby. In construing this section consideration shall be
given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the
federal courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2002).
Additionally, McDonald's contended that the congressional grant of
authority and extensive FDA regulations regarding labeling also impliedly
preempt Cohen's claims. Alternatively, McDonald's **5 ***455 argued
that Cohen's cause of action should be dismissed under the doctrine of
experti
se' in
brandin
g and
labeling
motion
to
dismiss
,
ald's
argued
that all
restaur
page-pf3
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 3
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
are generally exempt from making any nutritional declarations.
McDonald's argued that the regulations that are the source of Cohen's
[8][9] "Section 2-619(a)(1) provides for a dismissal when 'the court does
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.' 735 ILCS 5/2-
619(a)(1)(West 2002). The presence or absence of subject matter
jurisdiction is determined from the nature of the case and the relief
sought.
Kemlin
except
(1)
cases
over
page-pf4
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 4
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (The Moses Taylor v.
Hammons, 71 U.S. (4 *633 Wall.) 411, 416, 18 L.Ed. 397 (1867) (the
judicial power of the federal government is exclusive in some cases and,
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it or
where a federal statute touches a subject or an object in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclud
e the
enforce
Congre
ss has
not
page-pf5
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 5
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
completely displaced state regulation of a specific subject or object, state
law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.
Kellerman, 112 Ill.2d at 438-39 [98 Ill.Dec. 24], 493 N.E.2d at 1049;
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. **7 ***457 de la Cuesta, 458
nutrition information for the foods they serve. Yet, Cohen argues that this
exemption does not defeat his cause of action and relies on 21 C.F.R. ß
101.9(j)
(2)(i)
(2003),
which
food
bears
page-pf6
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 6
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
label or in labeling or advertising. Claims or other nutrition information
subject the food to the provisions of this section." (Emphasis in
original.)
Relying on this regulation, Cohen contends that because McDonald's
commerce that are not identical to those prescribed in the NLEA. Indeed,
l
Busine
ss Law
ß
ants'
page-pf7
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 7
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
alleged misconduct was not violative of the Federal standards set forth in
seek, directly or indirectly, to impose liability for conduct sanctioned by
the NLEA. That plaintiffs' remedial objectives are entirely consistent with
the NLEA does not, however, render their action one to enforce the
NLEA per se, which kind of action may only be instituted by the Federal
remedy for injuries caused by knowingly deceptive and misleading
business ***459 practices where, as here, such remedy in no way
interferes with the Federal prerogative to promulgate and enforce uniform
maintains that the Act would provide the basis for his recovery while the
NLEA would provide the standard by which McDonald's nutritional
information is to be measured. Cohen claims that if McDonald's can
demonstrate that it complied with the NLEA, then it would defeat
action is in fact preempted. In this matter, Cohen contends that all this
court would do is look to the NLEA for guidance to determine if
McDonald's has committed common law fraud or committed a violation of
the Act. If what Cohen were demanding from this court were that simple,
inter alia, that labeling for foods that are intended for children under the
age of four shall not include declarations of daily percent for such things
as total fat, saturated fat and sodium.
We
y note
that the
McDon
ald's
referen
ce to its
Happy
strong
reserva
tions
about
french
fries
and
hambur
n under
the age
of four.
page-pf8
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 8
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
However, supposing for the sake of this discussion that the items that
appear on the McDonald's Nutrition Facts document are indeed intended
for children under the age of four, then the document violates this
regulation because the daily percent values for these categories appear
foods intended for children under the age of four and consequently has
not established a regulatory scheme for how these things should be
reported on labeling. To solve this dilemma, Cohen would have this
court place labeling requirements **10 ***460 on restaurants that provide
nonuniformity amongst the different states. In this matter, ultimately,
what Cohen is asking this state court to do is to interpret a federal
statute. We do not have the authority to do so and will not. As such, this
cause of action is preempted, and the trial court's decision to dismiss
Affirmed.
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 2
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2002) (the
Act)). Section 2 of the Act states:
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the
or damaged thereby. In construing this section consideration shall be
given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the
federal courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2002).
Additionally, McDonald's contended that the congressional grant of
authority and extensive FDA regulations regarding labeling also impliedly
preempt Cohen's claims. Alternatively, McDonald's **5 ***455 argued
that Cohen's cause of action should be dismissed under the doctrine of
experti
se' in
brandin
g and
labeling
motion
to
dismiss
,
ald's
argued
that all
restaur
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 3
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
are generally exempt from making any nutritional declarations.
McDonald's argued that the regulations that are the source of Cohen's
[8][9] "Section 2-619(a)(1) provides for a dismissal when 'the court does
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.' 735 ILCS 5/2-
619(a)(1)(West 2002). The presence or absence of subject matter
jurisdiction is determined from the nature of the case and the relief
sought.
Kemlin
except
(1)
cases
over
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 4
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (The Moses Taylor v.
Hammons, 71 U.S. (4 *633 Wall.) 411, 416, 18 L.Ed. 397 (1867) (the
judicial power of the federal government is exclusive in some cases and,
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it or
where a federal statute touches a subject or an object in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclud
e the
enforce
Congre
ss has
not
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 5
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
completely displaced state regulation of a specific subject or object, state
law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.
Kellerman, 112 Ill.2d at 438-39 [98 Ill.Dec. 24], 493 N.E.2d at 1049;
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. **7 ***457 de la Cuesta, 458
nutrition information for the foods they serve. Yet, Cohen argues that this
exemption does not defeat his cause of action and relies on 21 C.F.R. ß
101.9(j)
(2)(i)
(2003),
which
food
bears
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 6
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
label or in labeling or advertising. Claims or other nutrition information
subject the food to the provisions of this section." (Emphasis in
original.)
Relying on this regulation, Cohen contends that because McDonald's
commerce that are not identical to those prescribed in the NLEA. Indeed,
l
Busine
ss Law
ß
ants'
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 7
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
alleged misconduct was not violative of the Federal standards set forth in
seek, directly or indirectly, to impose liability for conduct sanctioned by
the NLEA. That plaintiffs' remedial objectives are entirely consistent with
the NLEA does not, however, render their action one to enforce the
NLEA per se, which kind of action may only be instituted by the Federal
remedy for injuries caused by knowingly deceptive and misleading
business ***459 practices where, as here, such remedy in no way
interferes with the Federal prerogative to promulgate and enforce uniform
maintains that the Act would provide the basis for his recovery while the
NLEA would provide the standard by which McDonald's nutritional
information is to be measured. Cohen claims that if McDonald's can
demonstrate that it complied with the NLEA, then it would defeat
action is in fact preempted. In this matter, Cohen contends that all this
court would do is look to the NLEA for guidance to determine if
McDonald's has committed common law fraud or committed a violation of
the Act. If what Cohen were demanding from this court were that simple,
inter alia, that labeling for foods that are intended for children under the
age of four shall not include declarations of daily percent for such things
as total fat, saturated fat and sodium.
We
y note
that the
McDon
ald's
referen
ce to its
Happy
strong
reserva
tions
about
french
fries
and
hambur
n under
the age
of four.
808 N.E.2d 1
Page 8
347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451
(Cite as: 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 808 N.E.2d 1, 283 Ill.Dec. 451)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
However, supposing for the sake of this discussion that the items that
appear on the McDonald's Nutrition Facts document are indeed intended
for children under the age of four, then the document violates this
regulation because the daily percent values for these categories appear
foods intended for children under the age of four and consequently has
not established a regulatory scheme for how these things should be
reported on labeling. To solve this dilemma, Cohen would have this
court place labeling requirements **10 ***460 on restaurants that provide
nonuniformity amongst the different states. In this matter, ultimately,
what Cohen is asking this state court to do is to interpret a federal
statute. We do not have the authority to do so and will not. As such, this
cause of action is preempted, and the trial court's decision to dismiss
Affirmed.

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