978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-14-07

subject Type Homework Help
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subject Authors Roger LeRoy Miller

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Mills v Chauvin
--- N.Y.S.2d ----
NY,2013.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
February 28, 2013
CITE TITLE AS: Mills v Chauvin
Vendor and Purchaser
Contract for Sale of Real Property
Seller's Unilateral Conversion of Contract into One Making Time of EssenceNotice Provided by Seller Unreason-
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The record amply supports Supreme Court's finding that the consideration for the promissory note was the $395,750
that Mills had provided to Chauvin in connection with the Amelia Village project and that the promissory note rep-
NY3d 855 [2013]), we conclude that Supreme Court's determination that Chauvin failed to establish a bona fide
defense of lack of consideration is supported by the record (see Friends Lbr. v Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 886,
887 [1997]; see generally Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v Aronis, 95 AD3d 826, 827 [2012]; compare American Realty
Corp. of NY v Sukhu, 90 AD3d 792, 793 [2011]).
44). As Supreme Court found, the evidence at trial **8 established that Chauvin was active in the partnership and its
financial affairs, and there was no evidence to suggest that Chauvin was excluded by Mills therefrom. As a result,
we agree that Chauvin failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a formal accounting (seePartnership Law §§ 43-44).
Nor do we discern any reason to disturb Supreme Court's determination that Mills had no obligation to pay addition-
ment.
Finally, the record supports Supreme Court's finding that Chauvin agreed to Mills' withdrawal from the Amelia Vil-
lage project and, therefore, Chauvin's related counterclaim was *1051 properly dismissed. To the extent not specifi-
cally addressed herein, Chauvin's remaining claims have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
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FN1. Although Chauvin initially purchased the property himself, he later executed a deed that reflected that
both parties had an equal interest therein through the partnership.
FN4. As applicable here, the former Code of Professional Responsibility provided that a lawyer could not
divide a legal fee with another lawyer who was not a member of his or her law office, unless: “(1) The cli-
ent consent[ed] to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees [would] be
made. (2) The division [was] in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given
ment that Mills would be repaid for “the $395,750 that [Mills had] advanced to date.”
Copr. (c) 2013, Secretary of State, State of New York
NY,2013.
Mills v Chauvin
END OF DOCUMENT
The record amply supports Supreme Court's finding that the consideration for the promissory note was the $395,750
that Mills had provided to Chauvin in connection with the Amelia Village project and that the promissory note rep-
NY3d 855 [2013]), we conclude that Supreme Court's determination that Chauvin failed to establish a bona fide
defense of lack of consideration is supported by the record (see Friends Lbr. v Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 886,
887 [1997]; see generally Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v Aronis, 95 AD3d 826, 827 [2012]; compare American Realty
Corp. of NY v Sukhu, 90 AD3d 792, 793 [2011]).
44). As Supreme Court found, the evidence at trial **8 established that Chauvin was active in the partnership and its
financial affairs, and there was no evidence to suggest that Chauvin was excluded by Mills therefrom. As a result,
we agree that Chauvin failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a formal accounting (seePartnership Law §§ 43-44).
Nor do we discern any reason to disturb Supreme Court's determination that Mills had no obligation to pay addition-
ment.
Finally, the record supports Supreme Court's finding that Chauvin agreed to Mills' withdrawal from the Amelia Vil-
lage project and, therefore, Chauvin's related counterclaim was *1051 properly dismissed. To the extent not specifi-
cally addressed herein, Chauvin's remaining claims have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
FN1. Although Chauvin initially purchased the property himself, he later executed a deed that reflected that
both parties had an equal interest therein through the partnership.
FN4. As applicable here, the former Code of Professional Responsibility provided that a lawyer could not
divide a legal fee with another lawyer who was not a member of his or her law office, unless: “(1) The cli-
ent consent[ed] to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees [would] be
made. (2) The division [was] in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given
ment that Mills would be repaid for “the $395,750 that [Mills had] advanced to date.”
Copr. (c) 2013, Secretary of State, State of New York
NY,2013.
Mills v Chauvin
END OF DOCUMENT

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