Mills v Chauvin
— N.Y.S.2d —-
NY,2013.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
February 28, 2013
CITE TITLE AS: Mills v Chauvin
Vendor and Purchaser
Contract for Sale of Real Property
Seller’s Unilateral Conversion of Contract into One Making Time of Essence—Notice Provided by Seller Unreason–
The record amply supports Supreme Court’s finding that the consideration for the promissory note was the $395,750
that Mills had provided to Chauvin in connection with the Amelia Village project and that the promissory note rep–
NY3d 855 [2013]), we conclude that Supreme Court‘s determination that Chauvin failed to establish a bona fide
defense of lack of consideration is supported by the record (see Friends Lbr. v Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 886,
887 [1997]; see generally Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v Aronis, 95 AD3d 826, 827 [2012]; compare American Realty
Corp. of NY v Sukhu, 90 AD3d 792, 793 [2011]).
44). As Supreme Court found, the evidence at trial **8 established that Chauvin was active in the partnership and its
financial affairs, and there was no evidence to suggest that Chauvin was excluded by Mills therefrom. As a result,
we agree that Chauvin failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a formal accounting (seePartnership Law §§ 43–44).
Nor do we discern any reason to disturb Supreme Court’s determination that Mills had no obligation to pay addition-
ment.
Finally, the record supports Supreme Court’s finding that Chauvin agreed to Mills‘ withdrawal from the Amelia Vil-
lage project and, therefore, Chauvin’s related counterclaim was *1051 properly dismissed. To the extent not specifi-
cally addressed herein, Chauvin’s remaining claims have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
FN1. Although Chauvin initially purchased the property himself, he later executed a deed that reflected that
both parties had an equal interest therein through the partnership.
FN4. As applicable here, the former Code of Professional Responsibility provided that a lawyer could not
divide a legal fee with another lawyer who was not a member of his or her law office, unless: “(1) The cli-
ent consent[ed] to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees [would] be
made. (2) The division [was] in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given
ment that Mills would be repaid for “the $395,750 that [Mills had] advanced to date.”
Copr. (c) 2013, Secretary of State, State of New York
NY,2013.
Mills v Chauvin
END OF DOCUMENT
The record amply supports Supreme Court’s finding that the consideration for the promissory note was the $395,750
that Mills had provided to Chauvin in connection with the Amelia Village project and that the promissory note rep–
NY3d 855 [2013]), we conclude that Supreme Court‘s determination that Chauvin failed to establish a bona fide
defense of lack of consideration is supported by the record (see Friends Lbr. v Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 886,
887 [1997]; see generally Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v Aronis, 95 AD3d 826, 827 [2012]; compare American Realty
Corp. of NY v Sukhu, 90 AD3d 792, 793 [2011]).
44). As Supreme Court found, the evidence at trial **8 established that Chauvin was active in the partnership and its
financial affairs, and there was no evidence to suggest that Chauvin was excluded by Mills therefrom. As a result,
we agree that Chauvin failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a formal accounting (seePartnership Law §§ 43–44).
Nor do we discern any reason to disturb Supreme Court’s determination that Mills had no obligation to pay addition-
ment.
Finally, the record supports Supreme Court’s finding that Chauvin agreed to Mills‘ withdrawal from the Amelia Vil-
lage project and, therefore, Chauvin’s related counterclaim was *1051 properly dismissed. To the extent not specifi-
cally addressed herein, Chauvin’s remaining claims have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
FN1. Although Chauvin initially purchased the property himself, he later executed a deed that reflected that
both parties had an equal interest therein through the partnership.
FN4. As applicable here, the former Code of Professional Responsibility provided that a lawyer could not
divide a legal fee with another lawyer who was not a member of his or her law office, unless: “(1) The cli-
ent consent[ed] to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees [would] be
made. (2) The division [was] in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given
ment that Mills would be repaid for “the $395,750 that [Mills had] advanced to date.”
Copr. (c) 2013, Secretary of State, State of New York
NY,2013.
Mills v Chauvin
END OF DOCUMENT